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CHAPTER I 
STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM AND RATIONALE 
Long a restricted domain of theology and philosophy the study 
of moral development has recently become a scientifically respectable 
area for research in psychology. Since the publication of his work, 
The Moral Judgment of the Child (1932), Piaget has been recognized as 
a pioneer in the developmental study of moral development. However, 
Piaget's major concern is cognitive development to which he has 
devoted his career. The relatively recent upsurge of interest in 
moral development can be attributed to Lawrence Kohlberg (1958), 
whose research has been of significant heuristic value. The scientif-
ic study of moral development is in its early developmental stages and 
is clearly resistant to easy solutions. However, it is a field for 
which society implicitly, if not explicitly, is asking. As Jessor 
(1975) states, "The importance of the work on moral development and 
its implications for society warrant the imagination and effort 
involved," (p. 179). 
Kohlberg (1975) equates moral development with moral judgment, 
and argues that the values underlying moral judgments can be evaluated 
within a framework of levels and stages of moral development. 
Although he states that other factors influence moral behavior, he 
views moral reasoning as the only distinctive moral factor in "moral" 
behavior. For Kohlberg, the distinctive evaluative criterion for 
"moral" action is the level of moral judgment. 
1 
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Since Kohlberg's initial contribution (1958), an increasing 
amount of literature has developed concerning moral development. 
Reviewing a sample of recent research in moral development, DePalma 
(1975) and Jessor (1975) state that, for the most part, such research 
has neglected to address itself to individual differences, specifi-
cally, personality variables that may influence the levels of moral 
development. By and large, the reported research has not been an-
chored in a theoretical framework. A great deal of research has been 
conducted with children addressing itself to particular aspects of 
behavior, (e.g. donation of a small amount of money or candy in the 
investigation of helping and sharing behavior), that have little 
relation to higher levels of moral reasoning especially at the mature-
principled level. Hogan (1975) cautions that if researchers continue 
to deal only with specific problems, exclusive of a general theoretical 
framework, their studies may be reduced to academic triviality. Hogan 
(1973) proposes the rooting of moral development research in 
personality theory. Based in personality theory, Hogan concentrates 
on character structure, (viewed as a function of a person's largely un-
conscious typical way of selecting, using, justifying, and enforcing 
rules), and proposes five variables that significantly effect charac-
ter structure and subsequently moral development, namely: moral 
knowledge, ethics of conscience-ethics of responsibility continuum, 
socialization, empathy, and autonomy. Socialization, empathy, and 
autonomy are reported to be developmental in nature. 
Although Hogan does not subscribe to a stage model of moral 
development, the present study addresses itself to the problem of in-
corporating Kohlberg's stage model within the theoretical framework 
suggested by Hogan. Kohlberg's stage model gives a logical basis for 
coordinating concepts. Hogan's model gives a theoretical framework 
for research in moral development. 
Two critical age periods have been hypothesized by Kohlberg and 
Kramer (1969) for the attainment of principled level of moral reason-
ing, the first being the period of preadolescence, ages ten to 
thirteen; the second, the period of late adolescence, ages fifteen to 
nineteen. Kohlberg and Kramer suggest that if during the preadoles-
cent period a solid conventional level of moral reasoning is not 
attained, then principled moral reasoning is unlikely to be attained 
in adulthood. They further contend that during the late adolescent 
period at least twenty percent of principled moral reasoning is 
required for the person to develop principled moral reasoning in 
adulthood. 
Since much research in moral development has been conducted 
without being incorporated into a theoretical framework and without 
consideration of individual differences, the present study addresses 
itself specifically to this problem by investigating three develop-
mental personality variables as they are related to Kohlberg's 
developmental stages of moral development, at the two age periods of 
preadol~scence and late adolescence. The study investigates the 
relationship between the personality variables of socialization 
(assessed by the social standards subscale of the California Test of 
Personality, Thorpe et al, 1953), autonomy (assessed by the self 
reliance subscale of the California Test of Personality), and empathy 
(assessed by a modified scale of empathy based on Mehrabian and 
Epstein, 1972), and the stages of moral reasoning for the two age 
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periods of preadolescence (assessed by Carroll's Test, 1974), and 
late adolescence (assessed by the Defining Issues Test, Rest, 1972). 
One hundred seventh grade students from a suburban Chicago public 
school were randomly assigned to the preadolescent group; one hundred 
and nine college students from a suburban Chicago junior college were 
assigned to the late adolescent group, each group being equally 
balanced for sex. 
The study was designed to provide information concerning the 
following questions: 
(1) Is there a statistically significant relationship between 
the developmental variables of autonomy, socialization, empathy 
and the stages of moral reasoning for the seventh grade and 
college samples? 
(2) What is the relationship between autonomy and dominant 
stage of moral reasoning, between socialization and dominant 
stage of moral reasoning, between empathy and dominant stage of 
moral reasoning for the hm samples? 
(3) What is the magnitude of any significant relationships? 
4 
(4) Is there a statistically significant difference between the 
relationship of autonomy, socialization, and empathy, taken as 
separate variables, with the dominant stage of moral reasoning 
for the different age groups? 
(5) Are there significant sex differences in autonomy, social-
ization, and empathy, taken separately, and in relation to the 
dominant stage of moral reasoning for either age group? 
Information concerning these questions may very well have far 
reaching educational implications for schools, teachers, teacher 
5 
training institutions> and parents in relation to.the mora~ growth of 
the child. The atmosphere of school and classroom (as well as the 
home) facilitates or inhibits a child's growth in many areas. Even 
though the socialization of the child may be basically completed by 
the time the child enters school (as Hogan claims), parents and 
teachers serve as primary models in stimulating the depth and breadth 
of the socialization process for the child. An atmosphere of openness 
to experience where the child receives empathic treatment from 
parents, administrators, and teachers and is exposed to a variety of 
role taking experiences stimulates growth in empathy. Parents and 
teachers who are strong, individualistic, independent, demanding, and 
yet fair, and who clearly label certain actions as right or wrong, 
explain rules, and make praise contingent on the attainment of 
specified standards, provide children with clear models for autonomous 
behavior (Baumrind, 1971). 
In order to become a facilitator and stimulator of moral grmvth 
in the child many skills are required of the teacher, namely: 
knowledge of the stage of moral reasoning for each child; the ability 
to communicate at a level of one stage above the child's moral reason-
ing stage; the ability to produce moral conflict, the resolution of 
which leads the child to a greater awareness of a h_igher stage or 
moral reasoning; (in discussions or moral dilemmas) the ability of 
utilizing real life situations relevant to the students' lives. It is 
safe to say that most teachers do not possess these necessary skills. 
School districts must be willing to provide long term in-service 
training for all those ivho are involved in the education of the child 
in order for these persons to facilitate and stimulate an atmosphere 
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that will be conducive to moral growth. School personnel must be 
willing to obtain such training. Teacher training institutions must 
be willing to revise their curricula so that future teachers will have 
the necessary skills and attitudes. If schools are to make progress 
in the area of moral development, boards of education and administra-
tors must take the lead in their commitment to moral education and 
all that this implies. 
A major implication, constituting a most delicate problem faced 
by school systems, is the reaction of parents to moral education. 
TI1is problem could possibly be alleviated by keeping the parents 
informed, by including parents on planning committees for moral educa-
tion, and by holding public meetings open to all members of the 
community where the goals and objectives of moral education are pre-
sented and questions are answered. By fostering the concept that the 
schools and parents are partners in the total education of the child, 
and by operationalizing this concept, school systems lay a foundation 
whereby delicate issues such as moral education are addressed with 
openness and integrity, and provide a setting in which constructive 
solutions for delicate problems can be determined. 
CHAPTER II 
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
The review of the literature will begin with a historical over-
view of the psychoanalytically oriented interpretation of moral 
development, and a review of the Character Education Inquiry of Hart-
shorne, May, and their colleagues. The major part of this chapter 
will be devoted to reviewing the literature concerning three major 
contemporary interpretations of moral development: (1) The Social 
Learning Interpretation (Bandura and Mischel); (2) The Cognitive 
Developmental Interpretation (Piaget and Kohlberg); (3) The Character-
ological Interpretation (Hogan). The major conceptual framework and 
research supporting each interpretation will be systematically 
presented. 
Historical Perspective 
Psychoanalytic Interpretation of Moral Development: Freud has 
greatly influenced psychology's view concerning moral development. 
Although researchers may disagree with some of Freud's conclusions, 
most accept his basic premise: that sometime in early childhood, 
the child begins to introject the behavior of the parent, and through 
the process of identification with the same sex parent, codes of 
conduct, such as moral standards and values, which originally were 
externally enforced, become internalized as part of the child's own 
standards. 
Freud viewed personality as composed of three systems- id, ego, 
7 
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and super-ego, the latter being the last system to be developed. 
Freudian theory conceives of the super-ego as the internal representa-
tion of the values and ideals of society as interpreted to the child 
by his parents and enforced by sanctions that reduce or increase 
tension. The super-ego is considered as the moral arm of personality~ 
representing the ideal rather than the real, striving for perfection 
rather than pleasure. The child wishing to reduce tension learns to 
develop his behavior as demanded by his parents. The super-ego 
consists of two subsystems, the conscience and the ego-ideal. Whatever 
the parent dictates as wrong and punishes the child for, tends to be 
incorporated into the child's conscience. \Vhatever is approved and 
rewarded by the parent, tends to be incorporated into the child's ego-
ideal. The conscience is the punishing subsystem~. of the super-ego 
making the person feel guilty; the ego-ideal is the subsystem that 
rewards the person by making him feel proud of himself. Freudian 
theory views the role of the parent as paramount in the moral develop-
ment of the child. 
Hoffman (1962) reviewing research on the role of the parent in 
the child's moral growth draws three conclusions from psychoanalyt-ically 
oriented studies (Allinsmith, 1960; Aronfreed, 1959; Greening, 1955; 
Heinicke, 1953; Hoffman and Saltzstein, 1960; MacKinnon, 1938; Mussen, 
1956; Sears, 1953; Sears, Maccoby, and Levin, 1957). First, identifi-
cation of the child with the parent is promoted through the frequent 
expression of warmth and affection; although there is some evidence 
that a threatening and punitive approach might, in some cases, also 
contribute to identification. Second, the development of an internal 
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moral orientation, especially in the context of an affectionate 
parent-child relationship is facilitated by the use of psychological 
discipline (i.e. measures which seek to have the child feel that he 
has fallen short of some ideal or that he has hurt the parent and 
consequently is less loved by the parent because of what he has done), 
especially with respect to one's reactions following the violation of 
a moral standard. Physical discipline or techniques that directly 
assert the parent's power over the child facilitate an external moral 
orientation dependent upon fear of detection and punishment. Third, 
the type of internalized morality that develops, (e.g. whether it is 
oriented predominantly toward human need or conventional authority) 
may be influenced by the particular kind of psychological techniques 
used, i.e. to what particular aspect of the child's need system does 
the psychological discipline generally appeal, such as needs for 
affection, self esteem, and concern for others. 
A word of caution is in order concerning the generalization of 
these conclusions. Since research on which the conclusions are based 
used mainly male subjects, generalization of these conclusions applies 
mainly to males. Psychoanalytic theory has always been better 
articulated and understood with respect to males. However, research 
sugges~s that the psychological forces induced in the discipline 
situation which facilitate internal moral orientation are different for 
boys and girls. In boys it seems to be guilt over the effects of the 
child's behavior on the parent; in girls it seems to be anxiety over 
losing parental love. 
The psychoanalytic interpretation of moral development does not 
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subscribe to moral education in the school since the processes of 
identification and internalization are said to be accomplished by the 
age of five and the developmental study of morality is not necessary 
after that age. The Freudian interpretation of moral development 
emphasizes feelings as the basis for moral conduct (conscience and 
guilt). Moral development consists of the identification and the 
internalization of the parent's standards and values in the child's 
super-ego, which is formed by the age of five. Morality is culturally 
relative within a framework of universal psycho-sexual stages, with 
the parent being the central influence in the moral development of the 
child. 
Character Education Inquiry: The pioneering research of Hart~ 
shorne, May, and their colleagues (Hartshorne and May, 1928; Hart-
shorne, May, and Maller, 1929; Hartshorne, May, and Shuttleworth, 
1930) set the precedent for studying moral character in that they not 
only utilized verbal responses but also observed the concrete behaviors 
of children, such as cheating, sharing, and the like. The subjects 
included eight thousand public school and three thousand private 
school children between the ages of eleven and fourteen. An attempt 
was made to measure each child's moral knowledge and actual conduct 
concerning honesty and service. The results reported that almost all 
children cheat so that they cannot be described as honest or dishonest. 
Cheating is situation specific so that it is not a character trait 
that makes a person cheat. Verbalizations concerning the value of 
honesty have little influence on actual behavior, the decision to cheat 
being based on the expediency of the situation and on the degree of 
risk and effort required. Honesty is also situation specific depending 
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on group approval and example rather than on internal moral values. 
The conclusions showed that there was no such thing as generality in 
moral behavior, the results showing little evidence for unified 
character traits but showing much evidence that moral conduct is 
situation specific. Accordingly, it was concluded that there was no 
such thing as individual character structured of virtues and vices; 
the child could learn only specific habits, in specific situations, 
and therefore there was no need for studying moral development, and 
moral education in the school would be ineffective. However, the 
subjects in the Character Education Inquiry were in early adolescence 
and preadolescence and it can be argued that they were at earlier 
stages of moral development in terms of Kohlberg's stages. Kohlberg 
(1969) found that thirteen year old boys most often gave responses 
associated \vith stage three of moral reasoning, followed by stage four 
and stage two next in order of frequency. Kohlberg argues that in this 
age range moral judgment is developing and incorporating values un-
favorable to aggression and to theft, but not yet to cheating. Whereas 
theft and aggression have obvious harmful consequences for others, 
cheating does not and requires a more advanced stage of moral reasoning 
to appreciate it as a moral imperative, probably stage four or above. 
Thus, among the age group studied by Hartshorne and Hay, resistance 
to cheating is determined by situational and expediancy factors. At 
later developmental stages, Kohlberg (1969) finds cheating decreasing, 
producing a correlation between amount of cheating and stage of moral 
reasoning. MacKinnon (1938) used college students as his subjects 
utilizing the methodology of the Character Education Inquiry in order 
to attempt a repudiation of the theory of specificity. After 
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interviewing the subjects concerning moral verbalizations he observed 
their behavior in a situation that offered the opportunity of 
apparently unseen cheating. Consistency \vas found in both honest and 
dishonest subjects and a general trait of honesty was said to be 
evidenced. In light of his data, MacKinnon concluded that the 
results rejected the specificity theory of Hartshorne and ~1ay. Hm<~­
ever, two different samples were used, preadolescents and adolescents 
by Hartshorne and May, college students by MacKinnon. The results 
of both investigations are consistent with Kohlberg's assumption that 
cheating requires a higher stage of moral reasoning than do theft and 
aggression, a stage four or perhaps higher. Theoretically, the 
college students in MacKinnon's investigation could have been at stage 
four or higher of moral reasoning so that the results of the Hart-
shorne-May studies and the MacKinnon study may well not be contra-
dictory to each other but complementary depending on the stage of 
moral reasoning of the subjects. 
Bandura's and Mischel's Social Learning Interpretation of Moral 
Development 
Since the late nineteenth century, observation followed by 
imitation has been recognized by psychologists as a principal mode of 
learnin.g. However, during the behavioristic revolution, observational 
or social learning theory fell into disrepute. Bandura is credited 
for calling attention to this long neglected mode of learning and for 
sharpening the distinctive features that differentiate social learning 
from instrumental learning. In addition, Bandura has been responsible 
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for a series of detailed studies that have invest_igated the variables 
influencing social learning~ such as the stimulus properties of the 
model, types of behavior shmm by the model, the consequences of the 
model's behavior, and the motivational set given to the subject. 
Bandura (1971) states that Behaviorism 1s validly criticized for 
neglecting determinants of human behavior arising from man's 
cognitive functioning so that traditional behavioral theories provide 
an incomplete account of human behavior. Cognitive processes (coding, 
imagery, symbolic representations, problem solving) are said to be 
involved in controlling the influence of reinforcement contingencies, 
in controlling or reinforcing one's own actions, in thinking out and 
evaluating alternate actions, and in supporting or,altering one's self 
concept. Central to the social learning position is the concept of 
imitative or observational learning. A critical component of observa-
tional learning is the nature of vicarious consequences, that is, the 
consequences, positive or negative, that come to a model for his or her 
behavior. A person will tend to perform or inhibit a response learned 
vicatiously to the extent that he believes he will be rewarded or 
punished in such a way. Reinforcement may also alter the level of 
observational learning by affecting what or who the observer will 
attend to and how actively he codes and rehearses the model behavior. 
Social learning emphasizes that the child's percepts are the 
basis for his behavior. The child observes the behavior of others and 
uses it as a model for imitation. If the child is to learn from the 
model, the model stimulus must be attended to. If the behavior of the 
model is to exert influence upon the child's future behavior, then the 
behavior of the model has to be coded symbolically, represented, and 
retained until the future arrives. The motivational factor deter-
mining the expression of cognitions and behaviors learned earlier is 
said to be the anticipation of reinforcement. New forms of behavior 
do not come suddenly. They are the result of long periods of 
conditioning which reinforce the person's approximations toward the 
desired behavior. In order for the approximations to begin, the 
person must first observe and then imitate a model. Whether or not 
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the observation of a model is followed by continuing imitation will 
depend upon whether the attempted imitation of the model's behavior is 
rewarded. Miller and Dollard (1941) have suggested that the child's 
tendency to imitate is an acquired secondary drive. The child may 
spontaneously or coincidentally imitate the behavior of another. 
When this is done the social environment rewards the child and rein-
forces his tendency to imitate. Bandura and Walters (1959) view rein-
forcement of imitative behavior as the basis of most acceptable 
behavior. They contend that when a child is told to behave in a 
certain fashion, whether verbally by instruction from the model or non-
verbally by observation of the model if the schedule of reinforcement 
is appropriate, the child will behave in that fashion. Contrary to 
Freudian theory, Bandura (1968) does not assume that the parents serve 
as the exclusive source of the child's moral judgments and behavior. 
Bandura calls particular attention to the important roles played by 
extra familial adults, and by the child's peers. 
Hischel (1973) contends that when we are looking at behavior or 
attempting to predict behavior, the cognitive act, social experiences, 
and the specific situation all must be examined. The person is not an 
empty organism so that the cognitive social learning view looks at 
how persons mediate the impact of outside stimuli and generate dis-
tinctive complex behavioral patterns. l\Iischel and Mischel (1976) 
state that a comprehensive psychological analysis of morality must 
consider both moral judgments and moral behavior. They distinguish 
between the competency or capacity (potency) that a person possesses 
to generate moral behaviors and the incentives or motivation for 
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moral performance in particular situations. Even though a person has 
the competency to generate moral behavior, the actual performance 
depends on motivational variables. Intelligence is viewed as having a 
major role in the development of moral competencies. Mischel and 
Mischel (1975) view intellectual competencies, age, and certain 
demographic variables, such as socioeconomic status and education, to 
be among the best predictors of the adequacy of social functioni_ng. 
Moral competency is said to include the ability to reason about moral 
dilemmas and encompass role-taking skills and empathy "of the sort 
required to take account of the long term consequences of different 
courses of action" (p. 4). 
Since considerable differences of moral reasoning and moral 
behavior may be displayed by the same person across different situa-
tions, .such individual differences and differences between people are 
accounted for in terms of each individual's unique social history. 
person who possesses the needed moral competency is capable of moral 
behavior; but whether he translates the capacity (potency) into 
performance (act) depends on specific motivational performance 
considerations in the particular situation, the person variables of 
most importance being the individual's expectancies and subjective 
A 
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values. A person has a great number of behaviors from which he is 
capable of constructing within any situation. What guides the person 
is his own expectancies about the consequences of the behavioral 
possibilities. These expectancies depend on the outcomes a person has 
received for similar behavior in similar situations and also on the 
outcomes the person has observed occuring to other people. All moral 
behavior, even that of the highest level, depends on expected 
consequences, which may range from immediate, concrete consequences 
for self, to autonomy from external rewards, including distant and 
abstract considerations and self reactions on the part of the person. 
Such autonomy does not mean that moral behavior no longer depends on 
expected consequences, but that the outcomes are more and more 
contingent upon the person achieving or violating his own standards, 
and on consequences that go beyond immediate concrete externally 
administered consequences. 
Different individuals may share similar expectancies about 
consequences and yet may choose different moral behavior patterns due 
to the differences in the subjective values each places on the 
expected consequences. Even if the subjective values for a specific 
behavior are shared, individuals may differ in their tolerance of 
behavioral deviations from the norms both in their O\m behavior or in 
the behavior of others. 
In every day life moral behavior depends on moral choices \-.rhich 
often require high levels of self control and attention to distant 
consequences of action. Such prolonged self control sequences hinge 
on the person's ability to regulate personal behavior amid strong 
temptations and pressures for long periods, without any obvious or 
17 
immediate external rewards. To go from moral thought to moral conduct 
requires self regulation. 
Moral behavior is said to be controlled by expected consequences, 
many of these being externally administered. However, each individual 
also regulates his own behavior by self imposed goals and standards 
and self produced consequences. In attempting to attain the 
standards that a person sets for himself, the road may be long and 
arduous. Mischel and Mischel (1976) hold that progress can be mediated 
by covert symbolic activities, (i.e. as the person reaches sub goals 
he uses self praise and self instruction to maintain goal directed 
behavior). Positive self appraisal and self reinforcement tend to 
occur when a person reaches self imposed standards; psychological self 
condemnation may result if the person fails to reach important self 
imposed goals. This self regulatory system requires "priority rules" 
for determining the sequence of behavior and "stop rules" for terminat-
ing a particular sequence of behavior. Moral behavior as any other 
complex human action depends on the execution of long, interlocking 
sequences of thought and behavior. Mischel feels that the concept of 
"plans" defined as the hierarchical processes "which control the order 
in which an organism performs a sequence of operations" is applicable 
here and merits much more attention than it has received. Mischel 
alerts us to the fact that a person may possess high moral principles 
and engage in harmful, aggressive, immoral behavior. 
Accordingly, the social learning interpretation of moral develop-
ment views moral behavior as a function of the person's conditioning 
and modeling history. In contrast to the Freudian viewpoint, moral 
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learning continues throughout life, the environment being the primary 
determinant of moral behavior. Morality is culturally relative and 
the role of adults and peers is critical, since they dispense rewards 
and punishment and serve as models. The function of the teacher is to 
serve as a good model and to reward appropriate behavior. The social 
learning interpretation is not dependent on sequentially hierarchical 
stages of moral development. Advancement in moral behavior occurs 
mainly in imitation of the behavior of others; the child is stimulated 
to change toward more appropriate behavior through modeling and 
rewards obtained for acceptable moral behavior. As learning continues, 
the achievement of a particular standard may take on reinforcing 
qualities of its own because past achievement has been paired with 
external reinforcement. The child gradually internalizes the 
standards of performance. The goal is to have the person eventually 
develop standard setting and reinforcement for moral behavior 
independent of externally controlled consequences. 
Research Supporting the Social Learning Interpretation of Moral 
Development 
Adkins et al (1974) in reviewing research on moral development 
cite a number of studies employing the social learning interpretation 
of moral behavior. Much recent social learning research has 
addressed itself to the relationship between observation of a model 
and prosocial behavior. A few studies have concentrated on the 
relationship between observation of a model and resistance to 
temptation. 
Several researchers studied college and adult subjects in their 
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naturalistic settings exposi_ng the subjects to a model condition 
where the model engaged in specific prosocial behavior. In contrast 
to subjects who were not exposed to the model condition, results 
revealed increased rates of: volunteering (Rosenbaum, 1956), 
donating (Bryan and Test, 1967), signing a petition (Hain~ Graham, 
fvlouton, and Blake, 1956), and helping to change a tire or complete a 
task (Test and Bryan, 1969). Laboratory studies employing model 
conditions in contrast to no model conditions showed that children 
exposed to the model condition increased anonymous donation activity 
(Rosenhan and White, 1967), sharing behavior (Harris, 1971) and rescue 
attempts (Staub, 1971). Witnessing a model engaged in non prosocial 
behavior or refusing to engage in prosocial behavior, decreased acts 
of volunteering (Schachter and Hall, 1952), and donation (Wheeler and 
Wagner, 1968). Schachter and Hall (1952) demonstrated that exposure 
of subjects to a volunteering model increased the rate of offering 
to volunteer; however, these subjects were found not to differ from 
controls who had not been exposed to modeling in the actual performance 
of the task that they had volunteered to perform. 
A few studies have explored the relationship of model nurturance 
to prosocial behavior. Midlarsky and Bryan (1967) found that the 
increased model nurturance in the form of hugging did not increase 
altruistic behavior in children. In an investigation of donation 
behavior, with fourth and fifth grade students as subjects, Rosenhan 
and White (1967) had the subjects interact with either a warm, neutral, 
or hostile adult model during a pre-experimental session. Later the 
subjects were exposed to a test for donation behavior. Results 
revealed no difference among subjects exposed to the three different 
model conditions. Grusec and Skubiski (1970) using third and fifth 
grade subjects exposed to either a high or a low nurturance model 
found no significant differences as a function of model nurturance. 
Hornstein, Fisch, and Holmes (1968) contrived an interesting 
situation in which a model "found" a wallet, wrote a letter to the 
owner, and then accompanied by the model's letter, the wallet was 
"relost." Adult subjects then came upon the wallet and the letter. 
20 
Results showed that those subjects who believed that they were similar 
to the model returned the wallet more frequently when the letter 
indicated the model felt good or neutral rather than bad, about 
returning the wallet .. When the letter revealed that the model was 
dissimilar, the model's feelings had no effect. Midlarsky and Bryan 
(1972) used fourth and fifth grade subjects who were exposed to a model 
who expressed positive affect either contingently or non contingently 
following acts of greed or charity. Results showed that expression of 
contingent positive affect significantly influenced anonymous donation 
behavior. The researchers further investigated the generalization of 
the donation behavior. Results showed that the effect did not hold up 
on a generalization task a week and a half later. 
White (1967) instructed fourth grade children to donate half of 
their winnings to charity. The experimental group who had received 
the instruction donated significantly more than the control group, but 
the effect did not generalize to a second test several days later. 
Several studies have exposed children to models who reminded them to 
practice charity or greed or were_neutral in their admonitions, in 
contrast to physical demonstration of donating behavior by the model, 
(Bryan, 1971; Bryan and Schwartz, 1971; Bryan and Walbek 1970a; Walbek 
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1969), Results showed that such exhortations do not affect young 
children's donation behavior. However, observation of the model who 
donated, usually affected donation behavior significantly. Al tho.ugh 
exhortations merely reminding children of prosocial behavior do not 
seem to affect donation behavior, there is some evidence from a study 
by Midlarsky and Bryan (1972) that exhortations that are rational and 
justify what is being preached do have significant influence on the 
donating behavior of fourth and fifth grade children. Gelfand et al 
(1975) using kindergarten and first grade subjects who displayed a low 
baseline rate of donating pennies to help a needy peer, exposed the 
subjects to instructional prompts to donate, and the subjects were 
praised for each donation. The results showed that both instructional 
prompts and praise appeared to increase the children's donation be-
havior. It appears that these studies show that merely exhorting a 
child to do something does not have a significant influence on the 
child. However, when the exhortation justifies why the child should 
show charitable behavior, when the child sees a model demonstrate 
charitable behavior, and when the child receives social reinforcement 
for charitable acts, under these conditions a significant effect upon 
the child's charitable behavior has been shown. 
What is the effect of inconsistency in what the model says and 
what he does? A few studies (Bryan and Walbek, 1970b; Midlarsky and 
Bryan, 1972) have investigated the effects on donation behavior by 
exposing second to fifth grade subjects to a model who either preached 
generosity but practiced greed, or preached greed but practiced 
generosity. Results showed that such inconsistency of the model has 
not been found to significantly affect later donation behavior. Payne 
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(1974) addressing himself to the lack of effect on these children by 
inconsistent models states that this result "would appear to indicate 
that exposure of young children to models does not trigger articulate 
cognitions regarding social obligations." However, Mischel and 
Liebert (1966) found that the inconsistency of a model did not affect 
the children's behavior in the presence of an adult; hut when the 
children were left alone (secretly observed) many of those who 
observed the inconsistant model lm-rered their own standards, while 
none of those in the consistant model condition did so. 
A few studies utilizing young children as subjects have explored 
the relationship between observation of a model and resistance to 
temptation. Bryan and Stein (1967) had kindergarten children observe 
a model stealing M & M candy, thus yielding to temptation, and a model 
who did not yield to the temptation; in one instance the model was an 
adult, in another instance the model was a peer. When the children 
were left alone, the two groups did not differ in their resistance to 
temptation. Stein (1967) using four year old boys had his subjects 
assigned to three groups; group 1 was assigned to a model yielding to 
temptation condition; group 2 was assigned to a resisting model; group 
3 was assigned to a no model condition. Results showed that the 
subjects exposed to the yielding model condition, yielded to temptation 
significantly more than those exposed to a resisting model or no model 
condition. Those exposed to a resisting model did not differ 
significantly from subjects who were not exposed to a model condition. 
Actually, the control group (exposed to no model condition) demonstrated 
slightly greater resistance than the group exposed to a resisting model 
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condition. An explanation given for the last result was that the 
deviant response was less available to subjects who had not witnessed 
a model (control group) than to those who had. Walters and Parke 
(1964) had five year old subjects observe a film in which a boy of 
similar age played with a forbidden toy and later received a reward 
or a punishment or neither reward nor punishment. The control group 
did not view the film. On a subsequent task involving prohibitions 
against playing with certain toys, children who had viewed the model 
being rewarded or receiving no consequences, deviated more quickly, 
more often, and for a longer period than control subjects. There was 
no significant difference between the group who viewed the model being 
punished and the control group. 
Bandura and McDonald (1963) attempted to modify children's moral 
judgments which were obtained on a pre-test using Piaget's story pairs. 
The age range of the children was from five to ten years. Three 
procedures were used in the experimental phase. The first involved only 
reinforcement in the form of praise when a child gave an advanced 
judgment as compared to the pretest. The second condition involved the 
children evaluating story pairs but alternating with an adult model who 
expressed moral judgments in opposition to the child's original 
orientation. The third condition was the same as the second with the 
addition of praise when the child made a judgment of the kind made by 
the model. Having completed the experimental phase, the children were 
taken into another room by an adult different than the model and were 
asked to evaluate twenty more story pairs. During this phase no praise 
or criticism was given and the model was not present. Results showed 
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that although praise alone was relatively ineffective in modifying 
the children's moral judgment orientation, modeling exerted a powerful 
influence in modifying the children's moral judgments. Cowan et al 
(1969) performed a study designed to replicate and extend the study of 
Bandura and ~lcDonald. The time between modeling and posttest was 
lengthened and a wider sampling of moral judgment items was used. The 
results constituted an impressive replication of the earlier study by 
Bandura and McDonald. Cowan et al argued that modeling studies provide 
data on limited aspects of moral judgment, overlooking several 
dimensions of moral reasoning as well as intention consequences which 
would be assessed by Piaget. In reply to the paper by Cowan et al, 
Bandura (1969) reasserts the social learning position on moral develop-
ment and suggests that modeling influences are more important in moral 
development than stage theories would lead us to believe. 
In most natural situations, children as well as adults are not 
exposed to a single model, but to a succession of models. Hill and 
Liebert (1968), Mc~1ains and Liebert (1968), and Liebert and Fernandez 
(1969) conducted a series of experiments within a social learning frame-
work. As a result of their work they have enumerated general state-
ments governing the effect of multiple modeling in relation to 
specifi~ rules: (1) A stated rule is more likely to be broken as the 
number of others whom one observes breaking the rule increases; (2) A 
rule is more likely to be followed as the number of others whom one 
observes upholding the rule increases. 
Summary of Research Supporting the Social Learning View of 
Moral Development~ Social Learning studies have concentrated 
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on the relationship between modeling and prosocial.behavior. A few 
studies have addressed themselves to the relationship between modeling 
and resistance to temptation. The review of the research addressed 
itself to four general areas of social learning as related to moral 
development: (1) Relationship of modeling to prosocial behavior; 
(2) Relationship of modeling to resistance to temptation; (3) 
Relationship of modeling to moral reasoning; (4) Relationship of 
multiple modeling to rule observance. 
Observance of a model engaged in specific prosocial behavior has 
increased rates of volunteering, donating, signing of a petition~ help-
ing to change a tire, anonymous donating, sharing, and rescue 
attempts, (Bryan and Test, 1967; Hain et al, 1956; Rosenbaum, 1956; 
Rosenhan and White, 1967; Staub, 1971; Test and Bryan, 1969; White, 
1967). 
Exposure to a nurturant model (model warmth) had no significant 
influence on altruistic and donating behavior, (Grusec and Skubiski, 
1970; Hidlarsky and Bryan, 1967; Rosenhan and White, 1967). 
Positive affect consequences as expressed by the model and 
similarity to the model significantly influenced returni?g of a lost 
object and anonymous donation behavior, (Hornstein, Fisch, and Holmes, 
1968; Midlarsky and Bryan, 1972). There is less evidence that praise 
given to a model significantly affects donation and sharing behavior, 
(Harris, 1970; Presbie and Coiteux, 1971). 
Verbal instruction, exhortations that are justified, and physical 
demonstration by models significantly affected donation behavior while 
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mere verbalization~ telling children to donate, did not affect their 
donation behavior, (Bryan, 1971; Bryan and Schwartz, 1971; Bryan and 
Walbek, 1970; Midlarsky and Bryan, 1972; Walbek, 1969; White, 1967). 
Instructional prompts and praise increased donating behavior in young 
children (Gelfand, et al, 1975). 
Two studies, (Bryan and Walbek, 1970; Midlarsky and Bryan, 
1972), showed that inconsistency in the verbal and physical behavior 
of the model (e.g. preaching charity but practicing greed) did not 
significantly affect later donation behavior. In another study, 
(Mischel and Liebert, 1966), inconsistent model behavior did not affect 
the subjects' behavior while the adult was present. However, when the 
adult was not present and the children were secretly observed, in-
consistent model condition subjects significantly lowered their 
standards. 
Observing a model yielding or resisting temptation did not affect 
children's resistance to temptation, (Bryan and Stein, 1967), while 
another study (Stein, 1967) found that exposure to a model yielding to 
temptation significantly increased children's yielding to temptation. 
Walters and Parke (1964) found that children viewing a model yielding 
to temptation and later rewarded, or neither rewarded nor punished, 
yielded more quickly, more often, and for a longer period of time than 
control subjects. There was no significant difference between the 
control group and the subjects viewing the model bei_ng punished. 
Although praise alone was ineffective, modeling exerted 
significant influence in modifying children's moral reasoning. 
(Bandura and McDonald, 1963). Cowan et al (1969) attempted to replicate 
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the Bandura-McDonald study. Their results constituted an impressive 
replication of the earlier study. 
In a series of multiple modeling studies_, results showed that 
verbally stated rules are more likely to be followed or broken as the 
child observes increasing numbers of other people conforming to or 
breaking the rule, (Hill and Liebert, 1968; Liebert and Fernandez, 
1969; McMains and Liebert, 1968). 
The evidence for short term specific influence of modeling is 
well established. However there has been a paucity of studies 
attempting to verify that observation of a model produces enduring 
dispositions .. (Midlarsky and Bryan, 1972; White, 1967), and these 
studies attempted generalization studies a few days to a week and a 
half later, with the result that the effect did not generalize. As D. 
L. Krebs (1970) has pointed out, before conclusions of acquired 
behavioral dispositions can be made, the effects must be shown to be 
generalizable to situations dissimilar to the testing situation. Even 
though social learning researchers have attempted to make laboratory 
situations as real as possible, the question of unrepresentativeness, 
due to the possible artificiality of laboratory measures, remains a 
problem. 
Much of the social learning research has dealt with trivial 
forms of donating, sharing, and helping behavior, such as donating 
pennies to a needy peer, (Gelfand, 1975). Few investigations have 
included higher levels of sharing and helping behavior such as giving 
up a substantial amount of one's own time or money, or helping where 
danger or risk exists. Adkins et al (1974) state: 
... trivial or low cost, as opposed to high cost prosocial 
behavior may follow different laws or be affected by different 
variables. Until it has been demonstrated that the same laws 
govern behavior in two different situations, it is unwarranted 
to assume that the situations measure the same thi_ng (p. 122). 
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This may well account for the conflicting results concerning observa-
tion of an inconsistent model, (Bryan and Walbek, 1970; Midlarsky and 
Bryan, 1972; Mischel and Liebert, 1966), and the effect of a yielding 
to temptation model on subjects exposed to that condition, (Bryan 
and Stein, 1967; Stein, 1967). 
Since age ranges and sex differences were limited, these social 
learning studies appear to give little information concerning 
developmental trends and sex differences. In future social learning 
investigations, attempts should be made to conduct studies addressed 
to developmental trends, sex differences, the generalization of model-
ing effects in naturalistic settings employing both low cost and high 
cost prosocial behavior. Arbutnot (1975) addressing himself to the 
issue of modeling and reinforcement producing specific modification of 
responses to moral judgments in children> states that these studies 
may have succeeded only in training subjects to recognize moral 
responses different from their own and to respond in the desired 
manner to obtain reward or approval whether or not the children under-
stood the responses. Lickona (1976) explains the results of these 
studies in terms of the distinction between structure and content. 
Structure of thought is conceived as a filter that determines the 
meaning and impact of content. A person's susceptibility to influence 
of content varies with the stage of moral development, with the great-
est ~usceptibility being at the conventional level since the person 
depends on the group for moral definition of the situation. The 
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results obtained by Bandura and McDonald (1963) and Cowan et al (1969) 
are seen as content overwhelming structure so that the adult social 
influence caused the children to abandon, at least temporarily, a 
more advanced stage of moral development in favor of a lower stage 
that focused on material reinf~rcement. And yet as Bandura (1969) 
claims, modeling may well play a greater role in moral development 
than stage theorists are willing to recognize. 
Piaget's and Kohlberg's Cognitive Developmental Interpretation of Moral 
Development 
Piaget and his associates have been publishing their findings on 
the development of cognitive processes in children since 1927. The 
extensive formulation of children's cognitive development was extended 
to moral development in Piaget's work, The Horal Judgment of the Child 
(1932). The subjects studied by Piaget ranged in age from four to 
thirteen years and were reported to be from the lower socioeconomic 
sections of Geneva, Switzerland. In order to measure the children's 
level of moral judgment, Piaget presented pairs of stories to his 
subjects. The stories differed from each other on two dimensions: 
(1) the actual amount of damage done; (2) the intentions of the 
transgressor. The story pairs presented these dimensions in opposition 
to each other and level of moral judgment was determined on how the 
children responded to these dimensions. An example of Piaget's stoty 
pairs follows: 
John was in his room when his mother called him to dinner. 
John goes down and opens the door to the dining room. But 
behind the door was a chair·' and on the chair was a tray with 
fifteen cups on it. John did not know the cups were behind 
the door. He opens the door, the door hits the tray, bang go 
the fifteen cups, and they all get broken. 
One day when Henry's mother was out, Henry tried to get some 
cookies out of the cupboard. He climbed up on a chair, but 
the cookie jar was still too high, and he couldn't reach it. 
But when he was trying to get the cookie jar, he knocked over 
a cup. The cup fe 11 down and broke. (Piaget 1932) 
The child was required to judge the naughtier of the two characters. 
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Piaget views moral development as following a sequence of three 
stages. Stage one is the blind obedience stage involving objective 
morality or moral realism. This stage lasts up to ages seven or eight 
and corresponds to the sensori-motor and preoperational stages of 
cognitive development. The child's conception of morality is based 
on what the parents forbid or permit. Transgressions are evaluated 
solely in terms of the amount of damage done without any consideration 
of the transgressor's intent. 
Stage two is the progressive equalitarian stage involving 
subjective morality or moral relativism. This stage spans the ages of 
eight to eleven and corresponds to the concrete operational stage of 
cognitive development. Moral judgments take into account the spirit 
of the law and are made in terms of the apparent intent of the trans-
gressor, thereby being less absolute and authoritarian. 
Stage three is the moral autonomy stage, involving the tempering 
of purely equalitarian justice by considerations of equity, i.e. 
considering the individual's particular situation. This stage sets in 
towards ages eleven to twelve and corresponds to the formal 
operational stage of cognitive development. Rules are perceived as 
products of social interactions with peers and adults. Reciprocity and 
mutual agreement are paramount. Authority for rules stem from social 
consent and rules may be changed by consensus. This stage is 
accompanied by a degree of moral autonomy, and the child develops a 
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sense of ethical and moral responsibility for behavior. Piaget laid 
the foundation for the refined extension of the cognitive develop-
mental interpretation of moral development by Lawrence Kohlberg 
(1958). 
The main contemporary proponent of the stage dependent, cog-
nitive developmental approach to moral development is Kohlberg. He has 
incorporated into his own elaborate model the Piagetian concepts of 
developmental stage sequence, conflict, and imbalance as a necessary 
precondition for advanced moral development. 
Kohlberg (1968), Kohlberg and Turiel (1971) consider the child to 
be a moral philosopher since when children's moral judgments are 
examined, they have many standards that do not come in any obvious way 
from parents, peers, or teachers but rather from a morality of their 
own. The main goals of Kohlberg and his associates are the develop-
mental stages a person must pass through to arrive at the principled 
stage of moral reasoning. The role of moral educators and moral 
developmental psychologists is seen as focused on the prevention of a 
child remaining at a lower level of moral reasoning when the child 
begins to l.ag behind (Kohl berg and Turiel, 1971). 
Although not as interested in moral behavior per se as in the 
types of moral judgments a person makes, Kohlberg's levels and stages 
of moral reasoning are structures of moral judgment. What is important 
and significant is not the content of the judgment, i.e. the choice 
endorsed by the person, but the form, i.e. the process of r~asoning 
about the content or choices that involve a conflict of obligation. 
The mere verbalization of a moral judgment does not define the 
structure or stage of moral development; what defines the stage is 
the form, the why and how, of the verbalization. 
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Kohlberg acknowledges that one can reason in terms of principles 
and not live up to them. Although additional factors are necessary to 
translate principled moral reasoning into moral performance, he 
stresses that moral judgment is the only distinctive moral factor in 
moral behavior. Moral judgment change is long range and irreversible 
so that a higher stage is never lost. Moral behavior as such is 
largely situational and reversible in new situations (Kohlberg, 1975). 
Moral principles are defined as principles of choice for re-
solving conflicts of obligation (Kohlberg, 1971). A moral principle 
is a way of choosing that which is universal. Accordingly, Kohlberg's 
position is an absolutist view of morality and his universal absolute 
is rooted in the Kantian conception of justice. Kohlberg (1970) 
defines justice as treating every man impartially regardless of the 
man. A fundamental distinction is made between moral principles and 
rules. Moral principles are universal and allow for no exception; 
rules allow for and are subject to exceptions. Specific moral beliefs 
are also distinguished f~om moral principles since beliefs are con-
ceived of as being individually or culturally determined and therefore 
relative in content (Kohlberg and Turiel, 1971). 
Ten universal moral values are enumerated, namely; punishment, 
property, roles and concerns of affection, roles and concerns of 
property, law, life, distributive justice, liberty, truth, and sex. 
The stage of a person's moral reasoning defines what that individual 
finds valuable in these issues, i.e. how the person defines the value 
and the reasons he gives for valuing it. Moral choice is said to 
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involve choosi_ng bet\.'~een two or more of these values when they con-
flict in concrete situations of choice (Kohl berg, 1975). 
Kohlberg (1958) originally defined three levels of moral develop-
ment with two stages within each level. r-lore recently a premoral 
stage (stage 0) has been added resulting "in the formulation of the 
seven culturally universal stages of moral development" (Kohlberg and 
Turiel, 1971). Table 1 presents the moral stages in terms of what is 
right, the reason for doing good, and the social perspective behind 
each stage. It should be noted that Rest (1972, 1974, 1976) 
distinguished stage five into substages five A and five !• five A being 
the morality of social contract, five ~being the morality of intuitive 
humanism. Although the literature does not usually associate this sub-
stage distinction with Kohlberg, he does make the distinction in his 
1972 paper. Most recently Kohlberg (1976) conceptualizes stage three 
and above as having substages A and B. He states, 
We group the normative order and utilitarian orientation as 
interpenetrating to form Type A at each stage. Type B focuses 
on the interpenetration of the-justice orientation with an 
ideal self orientation. Type A makes judgments ... in terms of 
the given "out there." Type B-makes judgments ... in terms of 
what ought to be, of what is Internally accepted by the self 
(p. 40). 
Kohlberg reportedly is thinking of adding a higher stage that would 
account.for the moral maturity of prophets like Jesus and Buddha 
(Woodward and Lord, 1976). 
The stages are said to be sequentially invariant and hierarchical 
(Kohlberg, 1970; Kohlberg and Mayer, 1972). Rest, Turiel, and Kohlberg 
(1969) define an invariant sequence as one: 
Level and Stage 
Stage 0 - Premoral 
LEVEL I -
PRE CONVENTIONAL 
Stage 1 -
Heteronomous 
Morality 
TABLE 1 
THE MORAL STAGES 
What is Right 
Good is what is 
pleasant or exciting; 
bad is what is fear-
ful or painful . 
To avoid breaking 
rules backed by 
punishment, 
obedience for its own 
sake, and avoiding 
physical damage to 
persons and property. 
Reason for Doing Right 
Child is guided only by can 
do, and want to do. 
Avoidance of punishment, 
and the superior power 
of authorities. 
Social Perspective of 
Stage 
Presocial. Child 
has no idea of 
obligation, should, 
have to, even in 
terms of extreme 
authority. 
Egocentric point of 
view. Doesn't 
consider the 
interests of others 
or recognize that 
they differ from the 
actor's; doesn't 
relate two points of 
view. Actions are 
considered physically 
rather than in terms 
of psychological 
interests of others. 
Confusion of author-
ity's perspective 
with one's own. 
t.N 
.... 
Level and Stage 
Stage 2 -
Individualism 
Instrumental 
Purpose and 
Exchange 
LEVEL II -
CONVENTIONAL 
Stage 3 - Mutual 
Interpersonal 
Expectations, 
Relationships, 
and Interpersonal 
Conformity 
TABLE 1 (Cont'd.) 
What is Right 
Following rules only when 
it is to someone's 
immediate interest; act-
ing to meet one's own 
interests and needs and 
letting others do the 
same. Right is also 
what's fair, what's an 
equal exchange, a deal, 
an agreement. 
Living up to what is 
expected by people close 
to you or what people 
generally expect of 
people in your role as 
son, brother, friend, 
etc. "Being good" is 
important and means 
having good motives, 
showing concern about 
others. It also 
means keeping mutual 
relationships, such as 
trust, loyalty, respect 
and gratitude. 
Reason for Doing Right 
To serve one's own needs 
or interests in a world 
where you have to recog-
nize that other people 
have their interests too. 
The need to be a good person 
in your own eyes and those 
of others. Your caring for 
others. Belief in the 
Golden Rule. Desire to main-
tain rules and authority 
which support stereotypical 
good behavior. 
Social Perspective of 
Stage 
Concrete individual-
istic perspective. 
Aware that every-
body has his own 
interest to pursue 
and these conflict, 
so that right is 
relative (in the 
concrete individual-
istic sense). 
Perspective of the 
individual in 
relationships with 
other individuals. 
Aware of shared 
feelings, agreements, 
and expectations 
which take primacy 
over individual 
interests. Relates 
points of view 
through the concrete 
Golden Rule, putting 
yourself in the 
other guy's shoes 
Does not yet con-
sider generalized Vl IJ1 
Level and Stage 
Stage 4 - Social 
System and 
Conscience 
LEVEL III - POST-
CONVENTIONAL, or 
PRINCIPLES 
Stage 5-Social 
Contract or Utility 
and Individual Rights 
TABLE 1 (Cont'd.) 
What is Right 
Fulfilling the actual 
duties to which you 
have agreed. Laws 
are to be upheld 
except in extreme 
cases where they 
conflict with other 
fixed social duties. 
Right is also con-
tributing to society, 
the group, or 
institution. 
Being aware that 
people hold a variety 
of values and · 
opinions, that most 
values and rules are 
relative to your 
group. These 
relative rules should 
usually be upheld, in 
the interest of im-
partiality and because 
they are the social 
contract. Some non-
Reason for Doing Right 
To keep the institution 
going as a whole, to avoid 
the breakdown in the 
system "if everyone did 
it," or the imperative of 
conscience to meet one's 
defined obligations. 
(Easily confused with 
Stage three belief in 
rules and authority.) 
A sense of obligation to 
law because of one's social 
contract to make and abide 
by laws for the welfare of 
all and for the protection of 
all people's rights. A feel-
ing of contractual commitment, 
freely entered upon, to family, 
friendship, trust, and work 
obligations. Concern that 
laws and duties be based on 
rational calculation of overall 
utility, "the greatest good for 
Social Perspective of 
Stage 
system perspective 
Differentiates 
societal point of 
view from inter-
personal agreement 
of motives. Takes 
the point of view of 
the system that 
defines roles and 
rules. Considers 
individual relations 
in terms of place in 
the system. 
Prior-to-society 
perspective. 
Perspective of a 
rational individual 
aware of values and 
rights prior to social 
attachments and con-
tracts. Integrates 
perspectives by formal 
mechanisms of agree-
ment, contract, 
object impartiality 
and due process. (J,l 0\ 
Level and Stage 
Stage 6-Universal 
Ethical Principles 
TABLE 1 (Cont'd.) 
What is Right 
relative values and 
rights like life and 
liberty, however, must 
be upheld in any 
society and regard-
less of majority 
opinion 
Following self-chosen 
ethical principles. 
Particular laws or 
social agreements are 
usually valid because 
they rest on such 
principles. When laws 
violate these prin-
ciples, one acts in 
accordance with the 
principle. Principles 
are universal prin-
ciples of justice; the 
equality of human rights 
and respect for the 
dignity of human beings 
as individual persons. 
Reason for Doing Right 
the greatest number,'' 
The belief as a rational 
person in the validity of 
universal moral principles~ 
and a sense of personal 
commitment to them. 
Social Perspective of 
Stage 
Considers moral and 
legal points of view; 
recognizes that they 
sometimes conflict 
and finds it 
difficult to integrate 
them. · 
Perspective of a moral 
point of view from 
which social arrange-
ments derive. 
Perspective is that 
of any rational 
individual recognizing 
the nature of morality 
or the fact that 
persons are ends in 
themselves and must be 
treated as such. 
(Sources: Kohlberg and Turiel 1971; 
Kohlberg 1976). 
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" 
in which attainment of an advanced stage is dependent on 
the attainment of each of the preceding stages. It is 
further assumed that a more advanced stage is not simply 
an addition to a less advanced stage, but represents a 
reorganization of less advanced stages (p. 226). 
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Kohlberg (1971), consistent with stage theory, states that the 
stages are universal and culture free. He writes: 
A stage concept implies universality of sequence under varying 
cultural conditions. It implies that moral development is not 
merely a matter of learning the verbal values or rules of the 
child's culture, but reflects something more universal in 
development, something which would occur in any culture 
(p. 171). . 
The sequence of stages does not appear to be dependent on 
religious beliefs or lack of them. Kohlberg and Turiel (1971) state: 
No significant differences appear in the development of moral 
thinking among Catholics, Protestants, Jews, Buddhists, 
Moslems, and Atheists. Children's moral values in the 
religious area seem to go through the same stages as their 
general moral values (p. 438). 
Stages generalize over a field of responses (Kohlberg, 1970; 
Kohl berg and Mayer, 1972), i.e. behavior at a specific stage is truly 
learned and not forgotten in contrast to responses artificially 
taught, which are soon forgotten or unlearned. 
The attainment of a given Piagetian cognitive stage is a 
necessary but not sufficient condition for the parallel moral reasoning 
stage. Kohlberg (1975) enunciates the necessary cognitive develop-
mental stages in relation to his stages of moral development. Piaget's 
concrete operational stage is a prerequisite for the preconventional 
level, stages one and two. The cognitive stage of concrete operations 
plus a partial formal operational stage is required for the conven-
tional level of moral reasoning, stages three and four. Full formal 
operational cognitive reasoning is prerequisite for the principled 
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level of moral development, stages five and six. Most persons 
appear to be higher in cognitive development than in moral development. 
Kohlberg (1~75) gives the following example; 
Over fifty percent of late adolescents and adults are capable 
of full formal reasoning, but only ten percent of these adults 
(all formal operation~!) display principled (stages 5 and 6) 
moral reasoning (p. 671). 
Loevinger (1975) states that Kohlberg views cognitive develop-
ment as a necessary but not sufficient condition for the corresponding 
stage of Loevinger's ego development, which, in turn, is a necessary 
but not sufficient condition for the corresponding stage of moral 
development (Kohlberg, 1976). Loevinger's formula is that moral 
development, interpersonal development, development of self concept, 
and inner life proceed together as a single integrated structure. 
Loevinger (1975) states, "I believe that in measuring ego development, 
I am measuring moral development" (p. 63). Loevinger has sketched out 
the course of healthy ego development into a sequence of seven stages 
that are not age specific, namely; (1) Presocial and symbiotic; (2) 
Impulse ridden; (3) Opportunistic; (4) Conformist; (5) Conscientious; 
(6) Autonomous; and (7) Integrated. It would seem that Loevinger's 
stages of ego development and Kohlberg's stages of moral development 
are not mutually exclusive. Table 2 shows a possible correspondence of 
Loevinger's and Kohlberg's stages (after Loevinger, 1976). Kohlberg 
(1976) granting that a high correlation is suggested between measures of 
ego development and measures of moral development states: 
... such a correlation does not imply that moral development can 
be defined simply as a division or area of ego development ... A 
broad psychological cognitive-developmental theory of moraliza-
tion is an ego developmental theory ... To see moral stages as 
simply reflections of ego level, however, is to lose the 
TABLE 2 
CORRESPONDENCE OF LOEVINGER'S- AND KOHLBERG'S. STAGES 
Loevinger's 
Ego Stages 
Kohlberg' s 
Noral Stages 
Stage 1 Presocial - - - Stage 0 
Stage 2 Impulsive - - Stage 1 
Transition Stage Self Protective Stage 2 
Stage 3 Conformist - - - - - - Stage 3 
Transition Stage 3/4 Conscientious 
Conformist - Stage 4 
Stage 4 Conscientious - - - - - Stage 5 
Transitional Stage 4/5 Individualistic 
Stage 5 Autonomous - - - - - - Stage 6 
Premoral Stage 
Punishment and 
Obedience 
Naive Instrumental 
Hedonism 
Interpersonal 
Conformity 
Law and Order 
,, 
Social Contract 
Universal Ethical 
Principles 
Stage 6 Integrated - - - - - - (Proposed Stage 7) 
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ability to theoretically define and empirically find order in 
the specifically moral domain of the human personality 
(p. 53). 
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For Kohlberg, advancement in moral reasoning occurs through the 
stimulation of moral conflict at a level of one stage aboye the exist-
ing stage (Kohl berg and Turiel, 1971; Kohl berg and Mayer, 1972). 
Kohlberg and Turiel (1971) state that to stimulate change to a higher 
stage, three assumptions must be taken into consideration: (1) 
Children do not comprehend reasoning more than one stage above their 
own; (2) Children should be helped to advance one stage higher by 
inducing moral conflicts; in doing this the children should be helped 
to understand the higher stage of reasoning; (3) Spontaneous use of 
the higher form of reasoning should be provided for children so that 
they can be helped to accept the higher form in new situations. 
Kohlberg (1970) states: 
Our Platonic view holds that if we inspire cognitive conflict 
in the student and point the way to the next step up the 
divided line, he will tend to see things previously invisible 
to him (p. 82). 
A series of applications based on Kohlberg's model have been 
used in correctional settings (Kohlberg, Scharf, and Hickey, 1972; 
Kohlberg, Kauffman, Scharf, and Hickey, 1973). These have led to the 
concept of the "just community" in which rules are made and conflicts 
resolved through the discussion of fairness and a democratic vote. 
Such a program has been in operation since 197'1 and has stimulated 
moral reasoning advances in inmates. The "just community" program 
which aims at a stage five level of moral reasoning is also being used 
in several high schools in the United States. Reasonable rules are 
used as vehicles for moral discussion with the hope that a sense of 
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community will lead to behavior changes of a positive nature. 
Kohlberg (1975) is quick to point out that the societal moral 
atmosphere of the home, school, and society in general, must be con-
sidered when one considers the conditions that stimulate moral growth. 
Verbal I.Q. scores and mental age reflect a certain level of 
intellectual maturity and are a prerequisite for moral development 
since moral issues must be first understood before moral judgments 
can be made. However, Kohlberg (1969) states that I.Q. scores are 
poor predictors of maturity of moral judgment, the correlation 
between verbal I.Q. and maturity of moral judgment being in the 30s. 
Research Supporting Kohlberg's Cognitive Developmental Interpretation 
of Moral Development 
Research concerning Piaget's model of moral development will not 
be reviewed since the major emphasis of this section has focused on 
Kohlberg and his theory of moral development. Bronfenbrenner (1969) 
and Lickona (1976) give succinct surveys of research concerning 
Piaget's model of moral development to which the reader is referred. 
Turiel (1975) reports tentative results of a continuing longitu-
dinal study relating to the development of social concepts. A social 
conventional interview and a moral judgment interview were obtained 
from approximately 175 males and females between the ages of nine and 
thirty years of age. Subjects were reinterviewed at two or three year 
intervals. The research focused on the distinction between social 
conventional thinking and moral judgment. Turiel notes that previous 
explanations of social development either have treated social and moral 
concepts alike or have subordinated all social concepts to moral 
reasoning. The results, so far obtained, have reported that moral 
judgments and social conventional thinking are not reducible to each 
other; morals and mores were found not to be the same. 
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'Keasey (1975) investigated the relationship between Piaget's 
cognitive developmental stages and Kohlberg's moral developmental 
stages. Using twelve and nineteen year old girls as subjects, Keasey 
investigated the relationship between principled moral reasoning and 
the formal operational stage of cognitive development. The results 
showed that some of the subjects had formal operational thinking but 
not principled moral reasoning. However, there was no case of a 
person reasoning at the principled level of moral judgment that did 
not show evidence of a substantial amount of formal operational think-
ing. One of Keasey's conclusions was that formal operational thinking 
is a necessary but not sufficient condition for principled moral 
reasoning. In a second study, Keasey (1975) examined the relationship 
between concrete operational thinking and stage two of moral 
reasoning, utilizing seven and nine year old boys and girls as 
subjects. Results indicated that concrete operational thinking was a 
necessary but not sufficient condition for stage two moral reasoning. 
Kohlberg (1968) reported data concerning cross cultural studies 
of moral reasoning in children from America, Taiwan, Mexico, Turkey, 
and Yucatan. These data suggest that the stages of moral reasoning 
are universal and not purely an American construct, even though initial 
evidence shows that the principled level is not often attained iri 
primitive or preliterate societies. 
Turiel (1966) utilizing forty-four middle class boys, ages twelve 
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and thirteen, tested the hypotheses that Kohlberg's stages form an 
invariant sequence and that each stage represents a reorganization and 
displacement of the preceding stage. In terms of the invariance of 
the sequence of stages, Turiel felt that the hypothesis was confirmed 
even though the results only reached a borderline level of signifi-
cance. In terms of the second hypothesis the results were said to be 
only suggestive, since significant findings were minimal. 
Holstein (1976) in a longitudinal study investigated Kohlberg's 
assumptions regarding the sequential invariance and the irreversi-
bility of the stages. Middle class adolescents and adults were 
observed over a three year period as to their individual developmental 
sequences. Results supported sequential invariance but only in the 
movement from level to level rather than from stage to stage; and the 
sequential invariance was noted only for the first two levels of 
Kohlberg's three level model. As to irreversibility, regression was 
found for the higher stages. Kuhn (1976) reported results of 
sequentiality of the lower stages. Five to eight year old subjects 
showed significant progressive change, most of which consisted of 
slight advancement toward the next stage, after one year. White, 
Bushnell, and Regnemer (1978) reported that their three year longi-
tudinal and cross sectional investigation of moral development in 
Bahamian school children, ages 8 to 17, showed a general upward stage 
movement within and between groups. However, not one of the subjects 
reasoned beyond stage three. 
Several studies have investigated the relationship between a 
specific stage and various overt behaviors. R. L. Krebs (1971) found 
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that seventy-five percent of his adolescent subjects at stage four 
and below cheated on at least one of four experimental cheating tests 
while only twenty percent of the stage five youngsters cheated. The 
results of Brown et al (1969) were similar using college students as 
subjects. Almost fifty percent of the conventional level students 
cheated as compared to eleven percent of the principled level 
students. Milgram (1963) utilized college subjects who were told to 
inflict punishment to a student by increasing the severity of electric 
shock. The "victim" (an associate of the experimenter) had 
voluntarily agreed to participate in the learning experiment, and the 
subjects had made a contractual commitment to perform the experiment. 
Results showed that the majority of the students obeyed and continued 
to shock the "victim" to the danger point. Stage five students 
obeyed and conformed to the demands of the experimenter since they had 
entered into a contract agreement and the "victim" had freely con-
sented. Only stage six students clearly defined the situation as one 
in which the experimenter did not have the moral right to ask the 
subjects to inflict pain on another person. Seventy-five percent of 
the stage six subjects refused or quit shocking the "victim", while 
only thirteen percent of all the subjects at lower levels did so. 
Haan (~971) used the real life situation of the 1964 Berkeley civil 
disobedience by students who staged a sit-in at the administration 
building of the University of California to preserve the rights of 
political free speech on the campus. The administrators held a stage 
five position, namely, a student came to the university voluntarily, 
knowing the rules, and could go elsewhere if he did not wish to 
comply since he had entered into a social contract. The issue for the 
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students was the willingness to violate authority for the sake of 
civil rights. It was found that only the stage six moral reasoning 
students clearly defined civil disobedience as just. Stage five 
reasoning did not lead to a clear decision. Stage three and four 
students viewed such an action as a violation of authority. Stage two 
students were concerned with their own rights in a conflict of power. 
Eighty percent of the stage six, fifty percent of the stage five, ten 
percent of the stage three and four students participated in the act 
of civil disobedience. However, over fifty percent of the stage two 
students participated. This unexpected result was accounted for by 
the model of moral reasoning that differentiated the stage six students 
from the stage two students. Stage six students reasoned in terms of 
justice; stage two students reasoned in terms of self rights in a con-
flict of power. 
Freundlich and Kohlberg (1971) found that eighty-three percent 
of their sample of fifteen to seventeen year old delinquents from 
working class homes were at the preconventional level of moral reason-
ing while only twenty percent of non-delinquent subjects were pre-
conventional. 
Kohlberg, LaCross, and Ricks (1970) investigating the recidivist 
adolescent delinquent, state that such a youngster is not only at the 
preconventional level, but is likely to come from a delinquency prone 
neighborhood and from a family with severe problems. The authors 
state that in order to understand delinquency, sociological and 
psychological factors beyond immature moral judgments need to be 
considered. 
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Blatt (1971) conducted a series of studies investi$ating advance-
ment in moral reasoning using Kohlberg's concepts. Subjects were 
eleven and twelve year old Sunday School children. Discussion of moral 
dilemmas was held once a week for a three month period. Results showed 
that a significant number of children advanced almost one full stage 
and that this advancement in moral reasoning remained advanced one year 
later. A replication of the procedure was made in a public school 
setting with a class of black and a class of white children, ages 
eleven and fifteen years. Control groups were children who had no 
discussion sessions, and children who discussed moral dilemmas on their 
own without having a trained discussion leader. Although advancement in 
moral reasoning was not as great as in the first study, the increase on 
the experimental group ranged from one quarter to one half stage. 
Summary of Research Supporting Kohlberg's Cognitive Develop-
mental View of Moral Development: The review of research addressed it-
self to five areas of Kohlberg's cognitive developmental interpreta-
tion of moral development: (1) Comparison of social conventional 
thinking and moral judgment; (2) The relationship of a given stage of 
Piaget's cognitive development to a given stage of moral development; 
(3) Characteristic properties of the stages; (4) The relationship of 
the stages of moral reasoning to specific overt behaviors; (5) Advance-
ment in moral development. 
One researcher investigated the distinction between morals and 
mores. Results showed that moral judgments are not reducible to 
social conventional thinking (Turiel, 1975). 
The relationship of a given stage of cognitive development to a 
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given stage of moral reasoning was investigated by Keasey (1975). 
His findings showed that a formal operational stage of thinking is a 
necessary but not sufficient condition for principled moral reasoning; 
and a concrete opeTational stage of thinking is a necessary but not 
sufficient condition for stage two moral reasoning. 
Several studies focused on the characteristic properties of the 
stages of moral reasoning. Only borderline results were obtained 
for sequential invariance of the stages (Turiel, 1966), but there was 
some evidence of sequential invariance in movement from level to level 
for Kohlberg's first two levels (Holstein, 1976, Kuhn, 1976). Minimal 
findings were obtained for the assumption that a higher stage 
represents a reorganization and displacement of the preceding stage 
(Turiel, 1966). As for the assumption of the irreversibility of the 
stages, this assumption was upheld for the lower stages (Holstein, 
1976; White et al, 1978) but regression was found for the higher 
stages (Holstein, 1976). 
A few studies investigated the relationship of a particular 
stage to specific overt behaviors" Students who were at the principled 
stage of moral reasoning cheated very rarely while persons below the 
principled stage generally cheated (Brown, 1969; Krebs, 1971). In an 
investigation where the subjects entered into a contract to inflict 
pain (electric shock) on a volunteering "victim", only stage six 
subjects concluded that the experimenter had no moral right to 
inflict pain on another person regardless of the conditions 
(Milgram, 1963). Civil disobedience in terms of sitting-in at a 
university's administration center to preserve the rights of political 
49 
free speech was engaged in basically by stage six and stage two 
persons. What differentiated the two groups was their mode of moral 
reasoning (Haan, 1971). Two studies investigated the stage of moral 
reasoning of adolescent delinquents. Even though the authors state 
that other factors in addition to moral reasoning must be considered 
in studying delinquency, the majority of adolescent delinquents were 
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found to be at the preconventional level of moral reasoning (Kohlberg, 
LaCross, and Ricks, 1970; Freundlich and Kohlberg, 1971). 
Weekly discussion of moral dilemmas in a Sunday school class 
under a trained leader showed that a significant number of children 
advanced almost one full stage and the advanced moral reasoning was 
present a year later. However, a replication using public school 
children did not show as much moral reasoning advancement (Blatt, 1971). 
The distinction between morals and mores in the Turiel (1975) 
study gives initial support to Kohlberg's distinction between moral 
principles and societal rules. Kohlberg's conventional level of moral 
development can be reduced to social conventional thinking,. which 
according to Kohlberg's description is just that. However, it is a 
level through which a person must pass in order to advance to the 
principled level of moral reasoning. 
The work of Keasey (1975) partially confirms Kohlberg's conten-
tions regarding the relationship between Piaget's stages of cognitive 
development and the stages of moral development. However, Kohlberg 
requires full formal operational thinking for principled moral reason-
ing. Some of Keasey's subjects who reasoned at the principled level 
were not fully formal operational in cognitive thinking. 
Kurtines and Grief (1974) criticize Kohlberg's cross cultural data 
so 
in that the studies have never been published for fellow scientists to 
scrutinize. Quantative infonnation concerning sample size, actual 
scores, range and standard deviation of scores are not reported, and 
no description is given of the method used to determine stages of 
moral development. Simpson (1974) faults Kohlberg's cross cultural 
data in respect to the limited scope of the data, difficulty in using 
moral dilemma and verbal interview techniques demanding mode of 
thought and language not valued or developed in many cultures, and 
limitations of the use of value categories that may not reflect the 
categories of the culture being studied. 
Only minimal support is had for the invariant sequentiality of 
the stages with the inferred assumption that a higher stage is a re-
organization of the preceding stage, and for the assumption that the 
stages are irreversible. Sequential invariance has been found for the 
lower stages (Kuhn, 1976) and lower levels (Holstein, 1976); reversi-
bility was found in the higher stages (Holstein, 1976). Keasey 
(1975) states that the issue of sequential invariance has been fairly 
resolved. However, many would argue that such a resolution of the 
issue has not been attained. It would appear that a resolution of the 
issue would require longitudinal studies following children from the 
initiaL stage of moral reasoning through adulthood. 
Kohlberg's contention that the only thing moral about moral 
behavior is the moral judgment, receives support from the Haan (1971) 
study, whereby the factor that differentiated stage six and stage two 
students, engaged in the same overt action, was their stage of moral 
reasoning. 
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Another assumption of Kohlberg is that behavior at a specific 
stage is truly learned and not forgotten. This may \vell be true, but 
what is learned is not necessarily performed. The issue of moral 
reasoning leading to moral action has not been sufficiently addressed 
by Kohlberg and his associates. As f-.1ischel and Mischel (1976) have 
stated, a comprehensive model of moral development must take into 
account both moral reasoning and moral behavior. Kurtines and Grief 
(1974) raise questions concerning the arbitrary nature of the stages, 
the difficulty of comparing studies since different dilemmas have 
been used, the changes Kohlberg has made in his measuring instrument, 
and the reliability of the moral dilemma test. These questions 
should not be ignored but should be answered by Kohlberg and his 
colleagues. 
Kohlberg (1975) responded to criticisms at the biannual conven-
tion of the Society for Research in Child Development. However, his 
remarks are unpublished and a personal communication from The Center 
for Moral Education, Harvard University, reported that his talk was un-
available. 
Recent research by Napier (1976) has shown that teachers are un-
able to stage score moral reasoning statements lvi th an adequate degree 
of correctness by using Kohlberg's global rating manual and self train-
ing. Kohlberg and Fenton (1977) have prepared an audio visual workshop 
for the training of teachers. This workshop prescinds from the 
teachers' ability to classify student responses one stage above their 
present level. (Rest, 1974, has questioned the ability of teachers to 
respond to students' responses at a +1 stage). This is disturbing 
since the Kohlbergian literature concerning advancement in moral 
reasoning stresses that advancement is dependent on the stimulation 
of moral conflict at a level of one stage above the existing stage 
(Kohlberg and Turiel, 1971; Kohlberg and Mayer, 1972; Kohlberg, 
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1972; Kohlberg, 1975; Fenton, 1976). An explanation would seem in 
order concerning these omissions in the training program for teachers. 
A special focus for research would appear to be the character-
istic attributes of the stages (university, sequential invariance 
irreversibility); most studies have been cross cultural with the 
exception of Turiel's (1975), Holstein's (1976), Kuhn's (1976), 
White's et al (1978) and Kohlberg's \vork. Longitudinal studies are 
needed and such studies may well answer many of the questions that have 
been raised in this section. Finally, Kohlberg's cognitive develop-
mental view of moral development must address itself.to the transition 
from moral reasoning to moral performance. 
Hogan's Characterological Interpretation of ~·!oral Development 
Hogan (1973, 1975) espouses a developmental interpretation of 
moral development in that he subscribes to definable end points to 
development which are preceded by qualitative changes over time. 
Human development is viewed as an interaction between the human 
organism and the environment. However, Hogan's characterological 
developmental approach is a major departure from Kohlberg's interpre-
tation in that he does not accept sequentially invariant and hier-
archically arranged stages. 
Brown (1965) proposes that social psychologists be characterized 
by the set of problems on which they concentrate. Hogan (1975) 
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conceives of Brown's vic\~oint as perhaps the most critical problem 
facing psychologists studying moral development, in that, research 
and theory in moral development must be grounded in a broader con-
ceptua.lization of social action. Hogan conceives of the study of 
moral development as integrated within the larger theoretical context 
of personality theory. Such theory addresses itself to questions of 
in what way are people alike, in what way are they different, and 
what is the meaning of specific anomalous behavior? Hogan conceives 
of the commonality among persons as anchored in motivation and 
development. In terms of motivation, Hogan (1975) sees human beings 
as simultaneously "attention seeking and rule following animals 11 
(p. 154). Development is discussed in the context of two semantic 
aspects of personality, namely, role structure and character 
structure. Role structure is seen as the mode of action in social 
situations. Character structure consists of the inner, unconscious, 
deep, stable, and enduring dispositions that define a person as he 
truly is. Role structure is said to be a function of cultural-social 
determinants. Character structure is seen as resulting from the 
organism accomodating to familial, cultural-social, ethnic, and 
religious environment. Role structure and character structure taken 
together comprise the individual's personality. Character structure 
is inferred from overt attitude statements. The most important 
attitudes are those that a person develops in regard to the conven-
tional rules and percepts of his culture. 
Moral conduct is said to be essentially social conduct. Manners 
and morals are indistinguishable so that moral action is not distinct 
from ordinary social conduct. Hogan (1973) defines moral conduct as: 
... actions carried out with regard to the rules that apply 
in a given social context ... In the final analysis, moral 
behavior typically comes .down to either following or dis-
regarding a social rule of some sort; consequently a major 
problem for the psychology of moral conduct is to account 
for social compliance or noncompliance (p. 219). 
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For Hogan, moral action is understood primarily within the con-
text of character structure, i.e. in not what a person does, but in 
his reasons for doing it, characterized by the recurring motives and 
dispositions giving stability and coherence to social conduct. He 
undertakes to describe the dimensions along which character structure 
seems to vary among persons in terms of five personality variables, 
which are conceptually independent and seem to characterize how people 
differ in their use of rules. He writes: 
... these concepts are abstract dimensions of individual 
differences in nomotic (rule-governed) behavior, and as such, 
they should help explain moral conduct in any socio-cultural 
context (1973, p. 220). 
The five dimensions of character structure are: (1) moral knowledge; 
(2) ethics of conscience-ethics of social responsibility continuum; 
(3) socialization; (4) empathy; and (5) autonomy. These dimensions 
are said to explain a considerable range of moral behavior and define 
important parameters of character development. 
Moral knowledge is the base from which a person is able to make 
moral judgments. It involves the knowledge of social rules and has 
been associated with intelligence. Referring to Maller (1944) Hogan 
states that tests of moral knowledge and intelligence tests are 
functionally equivalent. 
The second dimension of character structure is the ethics of 
conscience-ethics of social responsibility continuum, called by Hogan 
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(1975) the moral intuitionism - moral positivism continuum. Ethics of 
conscience is based on the assumption that there are higher laws un-
related to human legislation, i.e. natural laws, which may be 
discovered by reason and intuition. Human laws are just, only if they 
correspond to natural law. The underlying attitudes of the ethics of 
personal conscience resemble the natural law morality of Thomas 
Aquinas. Ethics of social responsibility is based on the denial of 
natural law. Human laws are justified in terms of their instrumental 
value in promoting the general welfare of society and are based in 
utilitarianism and positivism. Hogan (1973) does not view these two 
dimensions of character structure (i.e. moral knowledge, and the 
ethics of conscience - ethics of responsibility continuum) as develop-
mental in the sense of having definable transition points which are 
preceded by qualitative changes over time. However, the three 
dimensions of socialization, empathy, and autonomy are viewed as 
developmental in nature and are said to be ·critical for mature moral 
development in the "normal" person. Hogan (1973) views these 
variables as major transition points in moral development occuring at 
progressively later points in time. He writes: 
... once attained, these capacities bring about qualitative 
changes in the underlying structure of moral conduct ... In 
this model, however, attainment of the later "stages" is not 
dependent on successful transition through the earlier levels. 
Rather, all three stages are distinct developmental 
challenges whose outcome defines each person's unique character 
structure (pp. 230-231). 
In contrast to Freud, Hogan (1973) believes that the child is social by 
nature. He states: 
Thus rather than ask what must be done to the child to fit 
him into society, it may.be more important to ask what must 
be done in order to drive him out (p. 221). 
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Hogan views the socialization process as being basically completed by 
the time the child enters school. The internalization of ·social rules 
brings about a qualitative transformation in character structure. 
Without further developmental changes, socialization produces what 
Hogan calls a characterological syndrome exemplified by the tendency 
to act as if rules are sacred and unchangeable and valuable for their 
mvn sake, the moral realism stage of Piaget (1932). 
Empathy, the fourth dimension of character structure, is viewed 
as an innate capacity which is facilitated by parental practices, 
but elicited by interaction with the social environment. Hogan v1ews 
the development of empathy as a product of peer group experience and 
the child's attempt to accomodate himself to an expanded set of social 
norms. Hogan believes that the development of empathy is probably 
completed by late adolescence. The development of empathy brings 
about a transformation in character structure. In persons low in 
socialization, empathy is said to serve as a compensatory incentive for 
prosocial behavior; in persons high in socialization, empathy serves 
to temper and humanize their moral realism. 
Socialization and empathy are committed to the status quo, while 
autonomy gives the capacity for prosocial non-compliance and is the 
source of constructive social change. The development of an autonomous 
sense of obligation produces a final transformation in character 
structure, and is said not to fully develop until a person leaves his 
peer group. Hogan (1975) writes: 
In conjunction with high socialization and high empathy, 
autonomy produces moral maturity~ a statistical rare 
character type. In conjunction with high socialization 
and low empathy_, autonomy tends to produce a stern, 
patriarchal .. old testament moralist ... In conjunction with 
low empathy and low socialization, autonomy tends to produce 
strong, effective, resolute, unyielding scoundrels (p. 163). 
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Research Supporting Hogan's Characterological Interpretation of 
Moral Development 
Hogan has specified the instruments for measuring the five 
dimensions of character structure. However, these measuring instru-
ments require fairly sophisticated levels of development, and conse-
quently should be used only with adolescents and adults~ and are not 
recommended for use with younger subjects. 
Moral knowledge being functionally equivalent to intelligence is 
measured by tests of general intelligence. Hogan (1970) has developed 
the Survey of Ethical Attitudes to measure the moral intuitionism -
moral positivism dimension of character structure. This measure of 
ethical attitudes is reported to be uncorrelated with intelligence 
and Hogan (1970) reports that in two separate samples, the instrument 
discriminated strongly between persons whose occupational choices 
reflected a belief in law and established procedures such as police-
men, and people who believed in civil disobedience as a means for 
promoting social change. Socialization and autonomy are measured by 
the socialization (Gough, 1969), and autonomy scales (Kurtines, 1973) 
of the California Personality Inventory. An empathy scale has been 
developed by Hogan (1969) which correlates between .30 and .50 with 
several measures of intellectual performance, suggesting that there 
seems to be some association between intelligence and empathy. This 
measure of empathy seemingly assesses empathy viewed as social 
cognition in contrast to empathy viewed as the vicarious sharing of 
the affective state of another. 
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Hogan (1973, 1975) administered a fifteen sentence completion 
type instrument to measure maturity of moral judgment using college 
subjects who were required to respond quickly and briefly to such 
items as: "The police should be encouraged in their efforts to 
apprehend and prosecute homosexuals. Homosexuality threatens the 
foundations of society." Consistant with Hogan's departure from 
Kohlberg's approach, the moral maturity test developed by Hogan and 
Dickstein (1972) does not use stage prototypic statements. The 
results of the 1973 study showed positive correlations between mature 
moral judgment and the personality variables of socialization (r=.40), 
empathy (r=.58), and autonomy (r=.56). In his 1975 paper Hogan 
reports the same correlations for socialization and empathy in 
relationship to mature moral judgment; however, a negative correla-
tion (r=-.04) is reported between autonomy and mature moral judgment. 
No mention is made in the 1975 paper regarding the positive correla-
tion between autonomy and mature moral judgment in the earlier paper. 
The explanation appears to lie in the instruments used for measuring 
autonomy. In the 1973 paper, autonomy was measured by an instrument 
of independence developed by Barron (1953); however, in the 1975 paper, 
Hogan advocates the use of the autonomy scale (Kurtines, 1973) of the 
California Personality Inventory. The use of two different measures 
of autonomy seems to account for positive (Barron measure) and 
negative (Kurtines measure) correlations between autonomy and mature 
moral judgment. 
In a recent study De Palma (1975) used the Defining Issues Test 
of Rest (1972) and Hogan's measure of empathy to investigate the 
relation between principled moral reasoning and cognitive empathy. 
Results showed that high principled subjects (P scores ~ 48) were 
likely to be high in empathy, while college subjects with lower 
principled reasoning (P scores<:48) did not show any trends but were 
equally dispersed. 
59 
Summary of Research Supporting Hogan's Characterological View of 
Moral Development: TI1e research supporting Hogan's view concern-
ing moral development is sparse due to the recency of his theory. 
De Palma (1975) found that subjects who were high in principled moral 
judgment on the Defining Issues Test, (Rest, 1972) were also high in 
cognitive empathy. 
Hogan (1973) reported positive correlations between mature moral 
judgment and the variables of socialization, empathy, and autonomy. 
Hogan's 1975 paper relates the same correlations for socialization and 
empathy, but reports a negative correlation for the relationship 
between autonomy and mature moral judgment. The difference appears to 
be due to the different measures used to assess autonomy. 
The Moral Maturity Test, (Hogan and Dickstein, 1972) a fifteen 
item sentence completion type instrument, must be questioned concerning 
its reliability. The test requires subjects to respond quickly and very 
briefly to controversial statements. It is questionable whether a 
valid response~an be obtained due to space and time limitations. 
Another issue that must be considered is the query, does the test 
measure moral reasoning? The Moral Maturity Test as well as Hogan's 
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Survey of Ethical Attitudes require further research in order to more 
firmly establish initial reliability and validity. 
Hogan (1969) states, "Empathy refers only to the act of con-
structing for oneself another person's mental state" (p. 308). His 
empathy scale is said to correlate .30 to .SO with various measures of 
intellectual performance. Hogan views empathy as a purely cognitive 
construct in contrast to Feshbach (1975), Feshbach and Roe (1968), 
Hoffman (1977), and Stotland (1969) who view empathy not only as a 
recognition of another's affect, but also as a person's vicarious 
affective response to another person's feelings. In measuring 
empathy, Hogan appears to be measuring social intelligence. 
Candee (1977) found that principled s_tage physician's were 
distinguished from their lower stage colleagues by three dimensions, 
one of which was their ability of placing themselves in the place of 
their patients. A typical statement made by the principled stage 
physicians was, "I put myself emotionally in the patient's position 
and try to understand what he is coping with." Although Candee calls 
this ability role taking, it is this emotional placing of oneself in 
another's position that is called affective empathy in the present 
investigation. 
Kohlberg (1976) views role taking as a more comprehensive term 
than empathy. He states "when the emotional side of role taking is 
stressed, it is typically termed empathy " (p. 49). Hoffman (1977) 
distinguishes between the cognitive awareness of another's emotional 
state and the vicarious affective response to another person's 
feelings. The former is designated as affective perspective taking, 
"or more simply, recognition of affect, since it pertains to the 
observer's cognitive interpretation of the other's emotional state. 
The second concept pertains to ... what is commonly thought of as 
empathy." (p. 712). 
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Feshbach (1975) stresses that empathy not only involves "the 
capacity to understand, but also the capacity to feel." (p. 28). 
Empathy is distinguished from social cognition in that the two are not 
merely different aspects of the same cognitive process, but are 
functionally distinct, even though, related variables. While empathy 
presupposes some degree of social cognition, the converse is not true. 
"Understanding the feelings of another person does not necessarily 
lead to an empathic response" (p. 26). The cognitive component of 
empathy is important, but it is the affective component that gives 
empathy its unique property. 
Recapitulation 
The work of Hartshorne, l\tay and their colleagues, psychoanalytic 
theory, and the resurgence of behaviorism, inhibited research concern-
ing moral development especially among American psychologists during 
the first half of the twentieth century. The Hartshorne and l\tay 
studies (1928-1930) regarding cheating and honesty, (subjects being 
children ages eleven to fourteen years) reported that honesty and 
cheating·are situation specific and their findings showed little 
evidence for unified character traits. They concluded that generality 
in moral behavior is non-existent. Psychoanalytic theory claimed that 
moral development was essentially completed by the age of five through 
the process of the child's identification with the same sex parent. 
Accordingly, study of moral development was not needed after that age. 
Finally, the behavioristic revolution, \vith its emphasis on overt, 
measurable behavior, had no place for such mentalistic constructs as 
conscience and moral reasoning. 
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It was Piaget, the Swiss psychologist, who laid the foundation 
for renewed interest in the study of moral development. He hypoth-
esized three periods or stages in the moral development of the child, 
based on a sense of justice. Piaget suggests that as a child becomes 
a member of a larger and more varied peer group, rules and moral 
reasoning may become less absolute and authoritarian, and more 
dependent on the desires and needs of the group. Piaget laid the 
groundwork for Kohlberg's contemporary interpretation of moral develop-
ment. 
The major focus of the preceding discussion of the literature 
was on three contemporary interpretations of moral development: (1) 
Bandura's and Mischel's social learning interpretation of moral 
development; (2) Kohlberg's cognitive developmental interpretation of 
moral development; (3) Hogan's characterological interpretation of 
moral development. 
Bandura's and Mischel's Social Learning Interpretation of Moral 
Development: Moral behavior is learned through modeling and 
reinforcement and continues throughout life with wide individual 
differences, the primary determinant of moral behavior being the 
person's environment. There are no universal values and morality is 
culturally relative. Mischel and Mischel (1976) distinguish between a 
person's competency to generate moral behavior and the actual perfor-
mance of moral action. The translation of moral competency into moral 
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action in a specific situation depends on the person's expectation of 
the consequences of the action and the subjective value that he 
places on these expectancies. ·All moral action is said to depend on 
the expected consequences, be they immediate and concrete or distant 
and abstract and contingent upon the person achieving or violating 
self standards. Prolonged moral behavior requires self control and 
covert symbolic acts such as self praise or self instruction can 
mediate progress toward arduous goals. 
Several studies have supported the relationship between pro-
social behavior and imitation of the model (Bryan and Test, 1967; 
Hain et al, 1956; Rosenbaum, 1956; Rosenhan and White, 1967; Staub, 
1971; Test and Bryan, 1969; White, 1967). The model's warmth 
(nurturance) had no effect on subject's behavior (Grusec, and 
Skubiski, 1970; Midlarsky and Bryan, 1967; Rosenhan and White, 1967). 
Positive affective consequences experienced by the model and the 
subjects' perceived similarity to the model were factors that in-
fluenced the subjects' behavior (Hornstein, Fisch, and Holmes, 1968; 
Midlarsky and Bryan, 1972); verbal instruction coupled with priase, 
justified exhortations, and actual demonstration by the model also 
were shown to affect behavior (Bryan, 1971; Bryan and Schwartz, 1971; 
Bryan ~.nd Walbek, 1970; Midlarsky and Bryan, 1972; Walbek, 1969; 
\fuite, 1967). Conflicting results appeared to be obtained in studies 
concerning the model's inconsistency in verbal and physical behavior 
and the influence of the modeling on subjects (Bryan and Walbek, 1970; 
Midlarsky and Bryan, 1972; Mischel and Liebert, 1966). Seemingly 
conflicting results were also obtained 1n studies investigating the 
influence on children of a model yielding to temptation (Walters and 
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Parke, 1964; Bryan and Stein, 1967; Stein, 1967). Modeling exerted 
significant influence in modifying children's moral judgments (Bandura 
and McDonald, 1963; Cowan et al 1969). Social learning research has 
focused on overt behavior and individual differences. Generally, such 
research has not investigated behaviors at the principled level, 
although Mischel's position seems to be promising. 
Kohlberg's Cognitive Developmental Interpretation of Moral 
Development: While social learning researchers focus their 
investigations on overt behavior, Kohlberg focuses his energies on 
moral judgment which he contends is the only moral factor in "moral" 
behavior. Kohlberg incorporates his model within a frame\Wrk of three 
levels and seven stages of moral development. The stages are said to 
be universal, sequentially invariant, hierarchical, and irreversible. 
Accordingly, morals are universal while rules are relative. Moral 
development occurs as a result of maturation and the person's inter-
action with his environment. Moral judgment is related to cognitive 
and ego development in that they are necessary but not sufficient 
conditions for moral reasoning. Persons one stage higher exert the 
greatest influence for moral reasoning advancement due to the moral 
conflict that is induced. Although Kohl berg vie\vs Loevinger' s stages 
of ego development as necessary but not sufficient conditions for 
moral judgment, Loevinger equates the seven stages of ego development 
with stages of moral development. 
Results of Turiel's study (1975) support Kohlberg's assumption 
that morals are not reducible to mores. Staub (1975) found that formal 
operational thinking is prerequisite for principled moral reasoning, and 
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concrete operational thinking is prerequisite for stage two moral 
reasoning, thus partially supporting Kohlberg's contention. The 
sequential invariance and irreversibility of the stages have received 
only minimal research support. There appeared to be a trend toward 
invariance in the first two levels (not stages) and regression was 
found in the higher stages (Turiel, 1966; Holstein, 1976). Research 
concerning the relationship of the stages to overt behavior has shown 
that principled level students rarely cheated (Brown, 1969; Krebs, 1971) 
that stage six students were the only ones to conclude that no one has 
the right to impose pain on another person (Milgram, 1963); that the 
majority of the students that participated in the same action of civil 
disobedience were either stage two or stage six in moral reasoning; 
what differentiated the two groups were their level of moral judgment 
(Haan, 1971). Adolescent delinquents were found to be at a pre-
cenventional level of moral reasoning (Kohlberg, LaCross and Ricks, 
1970; Freundlich and Kohlberg, 1971). Children discussing moral 
dilemmas with a trained leader who challenged them one stage higher 
than the stage they possessed, showed stage advancement, while children 
discussing the dilemmas without the leader showed no advancement 
(Blatt, 1971). In his focusing on moral judgment, Kohlberg addresses 
himself to the commonality among people in that heredity determines the 
sequent1al, invariant order of the stages, while the environment 
affects the rate of development at each stage. 
Hogan's Characterological Interpretation of Moral Development: 
By rooting moral development research in personality theory, Hogan 
addresses himself both to individual differences and alikeness among 
persons. Hogan contends that all people share a comnon set of motives 
66 
in that they are rule following,. group living, and "attention seeking 
animals." Hogan suggests that people are also alike in the parameters 
of personality development, i.e. in the development of cltaracter 
structure and role structure which taken together comprise individual 
personality. Hogan accounts for individual differences in terms of 
genetics and social experiences. Rejecting sequential invariant, 
hierarchical stages of moral development, Hogan views moral develop-
ment as being essentially the development of character structure. 
Hogan has concentrated on investigating the five dimensions that he 
considers to be a part of character structure: moral knowledge, ethics 
of conscience - ethics of responsibility continuum, socialization, 
empathy, and autonomy, the latter three being considered as develop-
mental in nature in that they represent transition points followed by 
qualitative changes. Due to the recency of Hogan's theory, only 
minimal research has been reported in the literature supporting it. 
De Palma (1975) found that subjects who were h.igh on principled moral 
reasoning were also high on the empathy variable. Hogan (1973) reports 
positive correlations between mature moral judgment and the variables 
of socialization, empathy, and autonomy; however, in a 1975 paper, a 
negative correlation was reported between autonomy and mature moral 
judgment. This discrepancy appeared to be due to the different 
instruments Hogan used for measuring autonomy. 
These three interpretations convey the tone of the current views 
regarding moral development, with social learning focusing on individual 
differences, Kohlberg focusing on the alikeness among persons, and Hogan 
(rooting his interpretation in personality theory) focusing on both 
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likeness and individual differences among persons. 
Mischel (representative of social learning) puts major emphasis 
on behavior, contending that moral development, bei_ng acquired as a 
result of modeling and conditioning, is continuous throughout life with 
wide individual differences; the environment is considered as the 
primary determinant of moral development. Kohlberg puts major 
emphasis on moral reasoning, contending that morality proceeds as an 
ongoing process into adulthood in sequentially invariant, hierarchical, 
and universal stages (related to cognitive and _ego development). He 
states that only a minority of adults arrive at the principled level 
which is usually reached only after the age of twenty. Heredity 
determines the fixed order of stages while the environment affects the 
rate of development at each stage. Hogan views character structure 
with its five dimensions as his point of major emphasis. Morality 
proceeds in "stages"" (neither sequentially invariant nor hierarchica 1) 
of socialization, empathy, and autonomy; the attainment of the later 
"stages" being independent of successful transition through the earlier 
levels, all three "stages" being distinct developmental challenges. 
Morality is an ongoing process into adulthood, with mature morality 
being a rare statistic; environment is the primary determinant of moral 
develop~ent, while heredity gives universal human motives and the 
construct of character structure. Mischel and Hogan view morality as 
culturally relative so that morals are equal to mores; in contrast, 
Kohlberg contends that moral values and the stages of moral development 
are universal so that morals are not reducible to mores. Mischel, 
Kohlberg, and Hogan all agree on the importance of moral reasoning in 
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the psychol_ogical analysis of moral development. 
Catania (1973) analyzing structural and functional psychology 
states that various areas in psychology complement rather than con-
flict \vith each other; he opts that controversy "may give way to more 
productive interactionsn (p. 440). The present study attempted to 
conceptually integrate Kohlberg's and Hogan's interpretations of moral 
development, by investigating the relationship of stages of moral 
reasoning with the personality variables of socialization, empathy, 
and autonomy with one major departure; empathy as defined by ~ogan 
(1969) refers to cognitive empathy (akin to social intelligence); 
empathy as defined in the present study refers to affective empathy, 
the vicarious sharing of another's feelings at least at the gross 
le'vel. 
CHAPTER III 
METHOD 
Hypotheses 
The present investigation tested the following null hypotheses: 
(1) The assessed personality variables of socialization, 
(assessed by the social standards subscale of the California Test of 
Personality, Thorpe et al, 1953), autonomy, (assessed by the self 
reliance subscale of the California Test of Personality), and empathy, 
(assessed by a modified scale of empathy based on Mehrabian and 
Epstein, 1972) will not be significantly related to levels of assessed 
moral reasoning for the seventh grade sample (assessed by Carroll's 
Test, 1974), and the college sample (assessed by the Defining Issues 
Test, Rest, 1972). 
(2) The relationship of each of the personality variables of 
socialization, autonomy, and empathy with the assessed dominant stage 
of moral reasoning will not be significantly different at different 
ages, namely, the seventh grade and college ages. 
(3) There will not be significant sex differences in socializa-
tion, a1,1tonomy, empathy, and the dominant stage of moral reasoning for 
either the seventh grade or the college samples. 
Subjects 
One hundred seventh grade students were randomly selected from a 
total population of 189 seventh grade students in a blue collar middle 
class public school located in suburban Chicago. Two special education 
69 
70 
classes were excluded from the sample. Since two subjects were 
eliminated due to incomplete responses~ and six students were absent 
when testing occurred, the final seventh grade sample included 92 
Caucasian students, 43 males and 49 females. All testi_ng \vas con-
ducted during a two week period in May, 1977. Science Research 
Associates (S.R.A.) educational ability (I.Q.) and achievement scores 
were available for all subjects. The mean population I.Q. was 102.40, 
standard deviation being 13.11, with a range from 68 to 140. The mean 
sample I.Q. was 102.37, standard deviation being 12.86 with a r~nge 
from 68 to 137. The population was somewhat below national norms in 
achievement, mean achievement scores being at the 44th percentile. 
In addition, one hundred and nine Caucasian junior college fresh-
men and sophomore students, attending a middle class junior college 
located in suburban Chicago, were tested during a three week period in 
June, 1977. Since four test protocols were incomplete and nine were 
of questionable reliability, the final college sample included 96 
Caucasian students, 43 males and 53 females, enrolled in an Intro-
ductory Psychology or a Child Psychology course. The students were 
informed by their instructor when the research testing would take 
place and they were given the option of not attending the testing 
session. All the students in the classes selected for testing chose to 
participate. 
Procedure 
Seventh Grade Sample: For testing purposes, the seventh grade 
sample was divided into four groups, each group containing 23 students. 
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Two class periods of forty minutes each were allocated for each group; 
during the first period, the·Carroll Test (1974) measuring level of 
moral reasoning was administered; during the second period, the 
instruments measuring socialization, autonomy, and empathy were 
administered. 
In order to control for reading ability, the instruments were 
administered both visually and auditorily, the examiner reading aloud 
the items while the subjects followed a written copy. The students 
were required to record their responses on two answer sheets, one used 
for responses measuring levels of moral reasoning, and the other used 
for responses measuring socialization, autonomy, and empathy (refer to 
appendix A). 
The following directions suggested by Carroll (1977) were used: 
I am going to ask you to think about four situations where 
individuals have to make difficult decisions. You are to read 
along as I read the situation to you. You may agree or dis-
agree with the advice given, but that is not your main task ... 
Rather, you are asked to decide whether the reasons that are 
given are good enough reasons for making such an important 
decision ... Remember, the most important task is to decide 
whether the reasons are good enough reasons for making such an 
important decision. 
The following directions were added by the examiner~ 
After a situation is read, you are to use the answer sheet and 
circle "yes" or "no". For instance, the first situation is 
about Heinz who has to make a decision about stealing a drug that 
might help his dying wife, since the druggist wanted ten times 
the amount it cost him and Heinz did not have the money. If you 
think Heinz should steal the drug, circle nyes"; if you think that 
Heinz should not steal the drug, circle "no". After each 
situation, there will be ten advice statements, forty in all, 
as you can see on your answer sheet. For each advice statement 
you are to mark it 1,2,3, or 4. If you accept the reason because 
it is good enough for making this important decision, you put 
down number 1; if you do not fully accept the reason but tend to 
accept it because it seems to be a good enough reason for making 
this important decision, put down number 2; if you tend to reject 
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the reason because it does not seem to be a good enough reason 
for making this important decision, put dmm number 3; if you 
reject the reason because it is not a good enbugh reason for 
making this important decision, put down number 4. Remember, if 
you fully accept the reason, write a number 1; if you tend to 
accept the reason, write a number 2; if you tend to reject the 
reason, write a number 3; if you fully reject the reason, 
write a number 4. (after Carroll, 1977). 
The following was written on the blackboard: 1 = fully accept; 2 = 
tend to accept; 3 = tend to reject; 4 = fully reject. 
Empathy was assessed utilizing a four point scale similar to the 
Carroll Test. If the subject strongly agreed with a statement he was 
instructed to answer with a 1; if he tended to agree, he was to 
answer with a 2; if he tended to disagree, he was to answer with a 3; 
if he strongly disagreed, he was to answer with a 4. The measures of 
socialization and autonomy required a "yes - no" response that was to be 
written on the answer sheet. Addresses of the students were available 
for possible follow up studies. 
College Sample: Ninety minutes were allocated for each college 
group during which a battery of tests was administered to assess level 
of moral reasoning, socialization, autonomy, and empathy. Unlike the 
seventh grade sample, the college sample did not have the items read 
to them. The subjects received printed copies of the battery and -were 
required to mark their ans\vers on the protocols. 
The directions, as given by Rest (1972) for the Defining Issues 
Test which measured level of moral reasoning, were printed on the 
protocol. An example was presented to the college students after which 
the examiner discussed the example with the subjects. Directions for 
the empathy instrument were the same as for the seventh grade sample 
(a four point scale, where 1 = strongly agree and 4 = strongly dis-
agree). The measures of socialization and autonomy required a "yes-
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no" response that was to he circled after e3.ch printed statement. No 
time limit was placed for the completion of the battery; however, 
subjects were informed that they could leave the room when they 
finished. Subjects were asked, on a voluntary basis, to include their 
home address on the first page for possible followup studies. 
'Instrumentation 
The California Test of Personality: The self reliance and social 
standards subscales of the California Test of Personality (C. T. P.) \vere 
utilized in the present investigation to measure autonomy and social-
ization, (intermediate level, form A for the seventh grade sample; 
secondary level, form A for the college sample). Kuder Richardson 
reliability coefficients for the self reliance subscales, intermediate 
and secondary levels, form A, are .70 with the standard error of measure-
ment being 1.64; for the social standards subscale, intermediate level, 
form A, r = .94, with the standard error of measurement being .67; for 
the secondary level, form A, r = .84 with the standard error of 
measurement being .60. 
The C.T.P. is a self report type instrument, comprised of five 
levels with two forms at each level, spanning the age range from 
kindergarten to adulthood, in which the subjects answer "yes" or "no" 
to stimulus questions. There are two parts to the test, personal 
adjustment and social adjustment, with six subscales for each part. 
Scores are obtained for each part, for the entire test, and for each 
subscale. 
The intermediate level was normed on 2,812 students, in grades 
seven to ten inclusive, from schools in Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, 
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Hashington, lVisconsin, and California. The secondary level was normed 
on 3,331 students in grades nine to fourteen, from schools in 
Connecticut, Massachusetts, Michigan, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, and 
California. About eighty five percent of the total normative 
population were Caucasians, and the remainder were Blacks, Mexicans, 
and other minority groups. 
The C.T.P. permits an objective, standardized testing situation 
with reliability coefficients for the two subscales of self reliance 
(r= .70 for intermediate and secondary levels) and social standards 
(r= .94 for intermediate level; r= .84 for the secondary level) being 
acceptable for use in the present investigation. The C.T.P. does not 
require the excessive time that is needed for individual assessment 
either by interview or the use of projective techniques, nor does it 
require inter-rater reliability. With its five levels, it allows for 
longitudinal studies. 
The Modified Empathy Scale: The seventh grade and college 
samples were administered the empathy scale developed by Mehrabian and 
Epstein (1972) which is a questionnaire type instrument containing 
thirty three items. The instructions given by Mehrabian and Epstein 
were such that the response to each item was to be on a scale of +4 
(very strongly agree) to -4 (very strongly disagree). However, the 
present investigation utilized a four point scale of 1 (strongly agree) 
to 4 (strongly disagree), since it was deemed beneficial to use the 
same scoring method for both samples in view of modifying the scale, 
and the seventh grade sample could not be expected to differentiate 
responses on an eight point scale. 
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The items of the Mehrabian and Epstein Empathy Scale were 
piloted with seventy nine seventh grade students (different from the 
sample) in order to deterQine whether these students would be able 
to comprehend items, since the original instrument utilized college 
students. Whenever any of the pilot group did not clearly understand 
an item, they were to raise their hands for clarification. The thirty 
three items basically remained the same except for a few minor 
changes. Item number three reads: "I often f~nd public displays of 
affection annoying." It was rewritten as follows: "I often find 
people kissing in public annoying." In item nine, "of my-
self" was added so that the item read, "I tend to lose control of my-
self when I am bringing bad news to people." In item nineteen, the 
words "ill treated" were changed to "mistreated." Item twenty three 
reads: "Sometimes at the movies I am amused at the amount of crying 
and sniffling around me." The words "and sniffling'' were omitted. 
Item thirty reads: "I become more irritated than sympathetic when I 
see someone's tears." The words "someone's tears" were eliminated 
and the item read " ... when I see someone crying." The changes were 
made only for the seventh grade sample; the college sample was given 
the empathy instrument as it was originally written. 
The original empathy scale is reported to have a correlation of 
.06 with the Crowne and Marlowe (1960) social desirability scale. The 
split half reliability for the scale is .84. Content validity was 
inferred in part from factor analyses. Initial studies by Mehrabian 
and Epstein (1972) have shown validity of the empathy scale in distinct 
settings, (aggressive and helping behavior). 
Since college subjects were used in the construction of the 
empathy scale, alpha coefficients of reliability (Cronbach, 1951) 
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were computed for both samples. For college subjects the alpha co-
efficient was .76; however, for seventh grade subjects, the alpha co-
efficient was . 52. In an attempt to improve the reliability, espe-
cially at the seventh grade level, a principal components factor 
analysis was performed. The first unrotated component for each of the 
two analyses was examined. Items were selected for the revised empathy 
scale if they met the following conditions: (1) the directionality 
( + or - ) of the i tern was the same in both analyses as well as in the 
original study; (2) the magnitude of the loading of the item in the 
first component in both analyses was .15 .. or larger. 
Twelve items met these conditions so that the revised empathy 
scale included items: +1, +7, +8, +9, +12i +14, -15, +17, +18, +19, 
-21, +31 (+ and - equal direction of scoring) from the original instru-
ment of Mehrabian and Epstein. In the present investigation, the 
revised empathy scale was used to measure empathy for the seventh grade 
and college sample, alpha reliability coefficient for the seventh grade 
sample being .63, for the college sample .78. The revised empathy scale 
for seventh grade subjects had a correlation of .11 with the social 
standards subscale of the C.T.P. and a correlation of .66 with the 
original scale (p = .001). For college subjects, the revised scale had 
a negative correlation of -.36 with the social standards subscale of the 
C.T.P., with the correlation between the two empathy scales being .87 
(p = • 001). (refer to Appendix B). 
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The Defining Issues Moral Reasoning Test - College Sample: 
The Defining Test (D.I.T.) developed by Rest (1972) \'las utilized to 
investigate the level of moral reasoning for the college sample. The 
D.I.T. consists of six moral dilemma stories which are read by the 
subject. The subject is required to make a choice among three 
options (yes, can't decide, no) in an attempt to resolve the dilemma. 
The subject is then presented with twelve issues bearing upon each 
dilemma. For example, for the moral dilemma of whether Heinz should 
steal an exces:;ively priced drug for his dying wife, the subject is 
asked to consider such issues as "whether Heinz is stealing for him-
self or doing this solely to help someone else," "whether a 
community's laws are going to be upheld," "what values are going to be 
the basis for governing how people act towards each other," and so 
forth. Each issue is rated on a five point Likert type scale of 
importance - most, much, some, little, or no importance. The subject 
then is required to rank his first four choices of the most important 
issues. It is from these rankings that the score is obtained. 
The D.I.T. manual (1974) gives detailed instructions for scoring. 
The basic score is the principled score (P score), interpreted as the 
relative importance attributed to principled moral considerations in 
making moral decisions, obtained by adding the subtotals from the post 
conventional stages (stages SA+ 5~ +6). In addition to the P score~ it 
is possible to assign subjects to lower stages by converting each stage 
score to a standardized score using the formulas in the manual. 
The construction of the D.I.T. was preceded by many hours of 
interviewing subjects concerning moral dilemmas and on ascertaining 
recurrent types of responses given in the free response mode, typical 
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of Kohlberg's stage characteristics. Having identified recurrent 
response types, the items for the D.I.T. were formulated. These stage 
prototypic statements were designed to exemplify the thought structure 
of a particular Kohlbergian stage of moral reasoning. Rest clearly 
states that the D.I.T. is an experimental measure and is an attempt 
to operationalize the psychological construct of moral development. 
The D.I.T. has been used in several studies and has shown definite age 
trends. 
A correlation of .68 was found between the D.I.T. and Kohlberg's 
method which has the subject talk or write about his moral thinking in 
a free response mode. The scorers use a standardized system to score 
and classify the responses. Inter-scorer reliability is computed. In 
contrast to Kohlberg's method, the D.I.T. presents the subject with a 
set of standardized alternatives representing the scoring categories 
and the subject is to choose among them. 
The reading level of the dilemmas are reported to be at least at 
the eleven year level and the level of the issue statements to be at 
the twelve to thirteen year level (McGeorge, 1973). Rest has found 
that ninth graders, even though not having difficulties with the words 
of the D.I.T., did not sufficiently understand the task of rating and 
ranking_the issue statements. For younger subjects Rest recommends 
the format devised by Carroll (1974). 
The D.I.T. was chosen for the present investigation since there 
is evidence for acceptable test - retest reliability (r=.65 to .81; 
McGeorge, 1973; Rest et al, 1974; Rest, 1976; Martinet al, 1977). 
The D.I.T. produces comparable information with each testing, 
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minimizes variance due to differences in verbal or written express-
ivity, is scored objectively thus minimizing scorer bias, does not 
require inter-scorer reliability~ and since it can be administered to 
groups, saves a great deal of time. 
The Carroll Moral Reasoning Test - Seventh Grade Sample: The 
Carroll Test (Carroll, 1974) based on Kohl berg's stages of moral 
development and following Rest's lead in the development of an 
objective instrument for measuring stages of moral reasoning at the 
lower age levels, was the measure utilized to investigate the level 
of moral reasoning for the seventh grade sample. The test requires 
the subject to resolve a dilemma and to give a separate rating for ten 
stage prototypic statements for each of four dilemmas. Stages five 
and six are combined into the principled stage (P stage) so that the 
stages for which statements are presented are one though four and the 
P stage. Cooper (1972) has shown that stages five and six cluster as a 
P stage on the D.I.T. In Carroll's pilot study, subjects being eleven 
to fifteen years of age, there was inadequate principled responding 
to reveal the distinctions of the principled level that Kohlberg 
hypothesized. 
The language of the stage prototypic statements was written for 
average or above average fifth grade readers. Carroll states: 
-Combining oral presentation of each item with the written form 
may make the measure useful with a somewhat younger or less 
able sample. At present the measure has been used with subjects 
between 11 and 16 years of age (1977, p. 1). 
Each stage prototypic statement is evaluated by the subject on a four 
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point scale: I accept ... I tend to accept ... I tend to reject ... I 
reject. For scoring purposes Carroll (1977) reconunends sunning the 
raw scores where reject equals four, tend to reject equals three, tend 
to accept equals two, and accept equals one. 
Reported internal consistency reliability coefficients are in 
the 70's for stage one and two, in the 60's for stage three, in the 
high 40's for stage four, and in the high SO's for the principled 
stage. Carroll states: 
In theory and method the measure is intended to complement the 
Defining Issues Test (D.I.T.) developed by James R. Rest. The 
measure is appropriate for less able readers or younger 
subjects than is the D.I.T. In addition, it focuses on 
subject's evaluation of lower stage reasoning rather than 
identification of principled issue statements. This measure, 
unlike the D.I.T., has had neither extensive replication nor 
longitudinal examination ... (1977), p. 1). 
In terms of useability, Carroll's test has the same advantages 
as Rest's D.I.T. It is an objective measure scored objectively, does 
not require interscorer reliability, does not depend on verbal or 
written expressivity, and saves a great deal of time, in contrast to 
Kohlberg's interview free response mode. 
Statistical Analyses 
Hypothesis 1: In order to test the first hypothesis the follow-
ing statistical analyses were computed for both samples: (1) Canonical 
analyses between socialization, autonomy, empathy (constituting set one 
variables) and the dominant stages of moral development (constituting 
set two variables); (2) analysis of variance for each of the 
personality variables of socialization, empathy, autonomy and assessed 
dominant stages of moral development; (3) Neuman-Keuls procedure; 
(4) trend analyses; (5) Pearson product moment correlation co-
efficients between measured socialization, autonomy, and empathy and 
dominant stage of mora 1 development. 
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Hypothesis 2: The following analyses were performed to test the 
second hypothesis: (1) Comparative analyses of selected data obtained 
in testing hypothesis one; (2) Testing the significance of the 
difference between the correlations obtained for socialization, 
autonomy, and empathy with dominant stage for the two independent 
samples (seventh grade and college subjects) utilizing the Zr trans-
formation for r. 
Hypothesis 3: The third nypothesis was tested by the foJlowi_ng 
statistical analyses computed for both samples: (1) T statistic with 
sex as the independent variable; the personality variables, and moral 
development stage scales as the dependent variables; (2) Pearson 
product moment correlation coefficients for each sex separately., 
relating socialization, autonomy, and empathy to the dominant stage of 
moral development; (3) Testing the statistical significance of the 
difference between the correlations obtained in number two above (males 
and females being independent subsamples) utilizing the Zr transforma-
tion for r. 
Definitions 
For the sake of clarity and uniformity of understanding, the 
following major terms used in the present investigation are defined: 
(1) Socialization is the score a subject obtained on the social 
standards subscale of the California Test of Personality. A social-
ized person is one who has come to appreciate the necessity of sub-
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ordinating certain personal desires and inclinations to the needs and 
rules of the group. 
(2) Autonomy is the score a subject obtained on the self reli-
ance subscale of the California Test of Personality. An autonomous 
person is one who can do things independently of others, depends on 
himself in various situations and directs his own actions, havi_ng 
attained the capacity to make decisions without being influenced by 
group or authority pressures. 
(3) Empathy is the score a subject obtained on the modified 
empathy scale. An empathic person is one who vicariously responds to 
the feelings of another, including sharing those feelings at least at 
the gross affect level. The present investigation focused on affective 
empathy (vicarious affective responses to anotherls feelings), in 
contrast to mere cognitive empathy (social cognition) which focuses on 
the recognition of another's affect and prediction. 
(4) Level of moral reasoning is the stage or level attained by 
the subject on the Defining Issues Test or Carroll Test, corresponding 
to Kohlberg's levels and stages of moral development. 
CHAPTER IV 
RESULTS 
Prior to the detailed statistical analyses of the data, the 
derivation of the assessed dominant stage of moral development for the 
seventh grade and college samples will be discussed. The statistical 
analyses related to the testing of hypothesis one will then be 
examined, followed by the statistical analyses for hypotheses two and 
three, with each null hypothesis being rejected or not rejected at the 
.05 level of significance. Following the major statistical analyses 
for each hypothesis, any further ancillary results will be presented. 
The computerized programs contained in the Statistical Package for the 
Social Sciences (Nie et al, 1975) were utilized for all statistical 
analyses with the exception of the Z transformations for r which were 
r 
computed by hand. 
Derivation of the Index of Dominant Stages of Moral Development 
The index utilized for the assessed dominant stage of moral 
development was that of "exceptional usage." "Exceptional usage" 
refers to the stage a person uses significantly more than any other 
stage. The criteria for its derivation will be presented in detail 
later in this section. 
-Rationale for Subject Exclusion: Since all subjects did not 
exhibit a clearcut dominant stage of moral development, the sample was 
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reduced when investigating dominant stage (college n = 73; seventh 
grade n = 64). In addition, the seventh grade sample was further 
reduced to sixty three, since one person was at dominant stage one. 
This subject was eliminated from subsequent analyses in order to 
utilize the same comparative sample for the analysis of variance, 
Student Neuman-Keuls procedure, trend analysis, and the Pearson 
product moment correlation coefficients. 
Dominant Stage Scoring Criteria: As previously mentioned in 
Chapter three, the scoring of the Carroll Test of Moral Development 
was on a four point scale (1 = fully accept; 4 = fully reject) so that 
a high score for any stage would reflect a low degree of stage 
acceptance, while a low stage score would be indicative of a high 
degree of acceptance of that stage. Accordingly, the assessed 
dominant stage, for the seventh grade sample, was obtained utilizing 
the following criteria: (A) the lowest score was chosen among the 
stages for each subject; (B) the lowest score was required to be 
adjacent to the next lowest score; (C) if two scores were equally lm~, 
adjacency was required and the extreme stage was chosen (e.g. stage 
one and two adjacent, stage one chosen; stage three and four adjacent, 
1 
stage four chosen, etc.). 
In similar fashion, the assessed dominant stage was obtained for 
the college subjects utilizing the following criteria: (a) the ~ score 
1The statistics presented in the tables of this chapter concern-
ing the seventh grade data and the data for empathy for both samples 
will reverse the original scoring system so that 1 = lowest and 4 = 
highest. 
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for a stage wasZ 1. 00; (B) if two or more ~ stage scores were~ 
1.00, they were required to be adjacent, with the highest Z score 
chosen as the dominant stage; (C) if no stage was predominant and the 
Z score for M (abstract, meaningless statements) \'las? 1. 50, the 
person was typed as ~; (D) if no stage nor !i_ predominated and the z 
score for ~ (anti establishment orientation) was Z 1. 00 the person 
was typed as ~- Subjects were typed M or~ only if the analysis of 
the scores showed a clearcut pattern for such typing. For a clearcut 
type !:! a ~ score~ 1. 50 was required since a Z score L 1.50 would have 
2 been misleading in some cases not identifying a clearcut !i_ type. 
Findings: Table 3 presents a summary of the number of subjects 
at the different dominant stages of moral reasoning for both samples. 
Forty-eight percent of the total seventh grade sample was solidly in 
the conventional level of moral development (stage three or stage 
four); twelve percent was at the principled stage, eight·percent was 
at stage two, and thirty percent did not exhibit a solid dominant 
stage. 
Of the total college sample, forty-five percent was within the 
conventional level of moral development; twenty-five percent was at the 
principled level, and twenty-four percent did not exhibit a solid 
dominant stage. However, when the H typed cases (n = 2) were excluded, 
since the subjects were responding to meaningless statements, and the 
~ typed cases were viewed as stage four-and-one-half as Rest (1974) 
suggests, then the percentage of college students not exhibiting a 
2It should be understood that dominant principled stage for the 
college sample = stage SA + SB + 6. 
Stage 
1 
2 
3 
4 
p 
n = 64 
TABLE 3 
Number of Subjects at Different 
Stages of Moral Reasoning 
Seventh Grade 
1 
7 
16 
29 
11 
Stage 
College 
n = 96 
2 7 
3 22 
4 20 
SA 9 
SB 7 
6 8 
P(SA+SB+6) 
n = 
M* 2 
A** 7 
no category 14 
non stage 
typed *** 23 
* not a stage 
** possibl~ stage 4 1/2 
(Rest 1 1974) not considered 
a stage in the analyses. 
*** non stage typed = M+A+ 
no category 
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24 
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dominant stage, was only fifteen percent. In the present study the A 
typed cases were treated as non stage typed cases. 
Hypothesis 1 
The assessed personality variables of socialization~ autonomy, 
and empathy will not be significantly related to levels of assessed· 
moral reasoning for the seventh grade and college samples. 
Canonical Analyses - Seventh Grade Samnle: Table 4 presents a 
summary of the canonical analyses for the seventh grade sample. It 
should be noted that the two sets of variables 1 namely, socialization, 
autonomy~ empathy (constituting group one variables) and stages of 
moral development (constituting group two variables) are significantly 
related to one another. Canonical analysis yielded a first canonical 
correlation of .48 that was significant at the .001 level. Canonical 
variates one reflect that low empathy and low socialization subjects 
reject stage three thinking, while tending to accept stage one think-
ing. Subjects scoring high in socialization, high in empathy, and low 
in autonomy accepted stage three thinking and rejected stage one think-
ing. 
The canonical analyses yielded a second canonical correlation of 
.38~ significant at the .026 level, indicating that seventh grade 
subj ect_s scoring high in socialization, high in autonomy, and lm.; in 
empathy rejected the lower stages of moral development and accepted the 
principled stage of moral development, (with the largest loading being 
for socialization, +.72, followed by autonomy, +.26, and empathy, 
-. 43) . 
From the canonical analyses for the seventh grade sample we have 
TABLE 4 
Summary of Canonical Correlation Analysis 
for Seventh Grade Sample (n = 92) 
Canonical 
No. Correlation 
Wilks 
Lambda 
Chi-Square D.F. 
1 .48 
2 . 38 
3 .21 
Socializa-
tion 
Empathy 
Autonomy 
.63 40.40 15 
.82 17.43 8 
.96 3.76 3 
Canonical Coefficients 
Group 1 
Canvar 1 
-.621 
-.854 
+.114 
Canvar 2 
+. 721 
-.430 
+.265 
Group 2 
Canvar 1 
Stage 1 +.326 
Stage 2 -.096 
Stage 3 -1.075 
Stage 4 +.027 
Stage p +.026 
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Sig. 
.000 
.026 
.288 
Canvar 2 
-.233 
-.598 
-.179 
+.004 
+1.019 
the following general schema: 
Canorli-
cal l 
Canoni-
cal 2 
Low empathy + low socialization + high autonomy = 
acceptance of stage one and rejection of stage three. 
High empathy + high socialization + low autonomy = 
acceptance of stage three and rejection of stage one. 
High socialization + high autonomy + low empathy = 
acceptance of principled stage and rejection of 
lower stages. 
High empathy + low socialization + low autonomy = 
acceptance of lower stages and rejection of the 
principled stage. 
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Canonical Analyses - College Sample: Table 5 presents a summary 
of the canonical analyses for the college sample. Canonical analysis 
yielded a first canonical correlation of .56 that was significant at 
the .001 level. Canonical variates one reflect that subjects scoring 
low in autonomy, low in empathy, and low in socialization accepted 
stage two of moral development and tended to reject the higher stages. 
The canonical analyses yielded a second canonical correlation of 
.48 that was significant at the .003 level. Canonical variates two 
indicate that subjects scoring high in autonomy, high in socialization, 
and low in empathy tended to accept stages two and six thinking and 
rejected stages three and five~ thinking, (the largest loading being 
for socialization, +.67, followed by autonomy, +.43, and empathy, -.70). 
The following general schema summarizes the results of the 
canonical analyses for the college sample: 
TABLE 5 
Sununary of Canonical CoTrelation Analysis 
for College Sample (n = 96) 
No. 
Canonical 
Correlation 
Wilks 
Lambda Chi-Square D.F. 
1 .56 .51 60.79 18 
2 .48 . 74 27.08 10 
3 .20 .96 3.50 4 
Canonical Coefficients 
Group 1 Group 2 
Canvar 1 Canvar 2 Canvar 1 
Socializa-
tion -.48 +.67 Stage 2 +.23 
Empathy 
-.70 -.70 Stage 3 -.12 
Autonomy 
-.08 +.43 Stage 4 -.54 
Stage SA -.84 
Stage 58 -.50 
Stage 6 -.19 
90 
Sig. 
.000 
.003 
.478 
Canvar 2 
+.57 
-.74 
+.08 
'. 
+.05 
-.26 
+.28 
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Canoni-
cal 1 
Low autonomy + low socialization + low empathy = 
acceptance of stage two and rejection of higher stages. 
Canoni-
cal 2 
High autonomy + high socialization + high empathy = 
rejection of stage two and acceptance of higher stages. 
High autonomy + high socialization + low empathy = 
acceptance of stages two and six and rejection of 
stages three and five B. 
Low autonomy + lmv socialization + high empathy = 
acceptance of stages three and five B and rejection 
of stages two and six. 
Further Results Related to Hypothesis 1: The canonical analyses 
investigated the relationship of the two sets of variables, namely, 
the personality variables of autonomy, socialization, empathy (set 1) 
and the assessed dominant stages of moral reasoning (set 2). The 
following analyses investigated autonomy, socialization, and empathy, 
taking each of these personality variables separately, in relationship 
to the assessed dominant stage of moral reasoning, for both the 
seventh grade and college subjects. The following analyses addressed 
themselves to two questions: (1) ~fuat is the relationship between 
level of autonomy and dominant stage of moral reasoning,between level 
of socialization and dominant stage of moral reasoning, between level 
of empathy and dominant stage of moral reasoning, for both samples? 
(2) What is the magnitude of any significant relationships? 
- ·--~· Seventh Grade Sample: Autonomy and Dominant 
Stage of Moral Development 
Table 6 presents a summary of the analysis of variance relating 
the dominant stage of moral development to the personality variable 
Source 
Between Groups 
\Vi thin Groups 
Dominant Stage 
2 
3 
4 
p 
Total 
TABLE 6 
Analysis of Variance: 
Dominant Stage with Autonomy for 
Seventh Grade Sample (n = 63) 
Sum of 
Squares 
76.19 
450.70 
D. F. 
3 
59 
Group Statistics 
Mean S.D. 
5.43 3.36 
7.13 2.68 
8.10 2.76 
9.36 2.50 
7.78 2.92 
Pearson r = .38 (P = .002) 
Mean 
Square 
25.40 
7.64 
92 
F Sig. 
N 
7 
16 
29 
11 
63 
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of autonomy_ for the seventh grade sample, with the Pearson correlation 
given between autonomy and dominant stage. It should be noted that 
the analysis of variance yielded results significant at the .026 
level, indicating significant differences in the dominant stao-es as a 
. 0 
function of autonomy. The Neuman-Keuls p:rocedure indicated that stage 
two subjects were significantly lower than the principled stage 
subjects in autonomy. Trend analysis revealed a significant linear 
trend with nonsignificant quadratic trends. The Pearson correlation 
coefficient being .38 (P = .002) lends substantiation to a linear 
relationship between dominant stage and autonomy. An investigation of 
the means of the dominant stages reveal a steady increase from stage 
two to the principled stage. Accordingly, it can be stated that as 
autonomy increases, dominant stage of moral development increases, 
that is to say, the higher the autonomy, the higher the stage of moral 
development for the seventh grade sample. 
Seventh Grade Sample: Socialization and 
Dominant Stage of Moral Development 
A summary of the analysis of variance relating dominant stage of 
moral development to the personality variable of socialization for the 
seventh grade sample, with the Pearson correlation coefficient between 
socialization and dominant stage, is presented in Table 7. No signif-
icance is found in the analysis of variance nor in the correlation 
coefficient, indicating that socialization does not seem to be signifi-
cantly related to the dominant stages of moral development for the 
seventh grade sample. 
Source 
Between Groups 
Within Groups 
Dominant Stage 
2 
3 
4 
p 
Total 
TABLE 7 
Analysis of Variance: 
Dominant Stage with Socialization 
for Seventh Grade Sample ( n == 63) 
Sum of 
Squares 
27.88 
296.97 
D. F. 
3 
59 
Group Statistics 
Mean S.D. 
9.14 2.41 
9.25 2.49 
10.69 2.24 
10.09 1. 70 
10.05 2.29 
Pearson r == .20 (N.S.) 
Mean 
Square F _ Sig. 
9. 30 1. 85 .149 
5.03 
N 
7 
16 
29 
11 
63 
94 
Seventh Grade Sample: Empathy and Dominant 
Stage of Moral Development 
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Table 8 presents a summary of the analysis of variance relating 
dominant stage and empathy, with the Pearson correlation coefficient 
between empathy and domim~nt stage. Analysis of variance reveals 
significance at the .034 level, with the Neuman-Keuls procedure 
revealing that stage three subjects scored significantly higher in 
empathy than those subjects at the principled stage. Trend analysis 
did not indicate linear nor quadratic trends, nor did the Pearson 
negative correlation coefficient indicate a linear relationship 
between empathy and dominant stage of moral development. It should be 
noted that the means of the dominant stages show that empathy seemed 
to be associated more with stage three then with any other stage. 
Seventh Grade Sample: Summary of Ancillary Statistical 
Results for Hypothesis 1 
The ancillary statistical analyses for hypothesis one, investi-
gating autonomy, socialization, and empathy taken as separate 
variables, for the seventh grade sample, seem to indicate that as 
autonomy increases, so does the dominant stage of moral development. 
Although there was a significant F ratio for empathy as related to the 
dominant stages, with stage three subjects being significantly higher 
in empathy than the principled stage subjects, neither trend analysis 
nor, Pearson correlation (negative correlation) revealed linearity. 
Socialization and the dominant stages of moral development were not 
significantly related. 
Source 
Between Groups 
Within Groups 
Dominant Stage 
2 
3 
4 
p 
Total 
TABLE 8 
Analysis of Variance: 
Dominant Stage with Empathy for 
Seventh Grade Sample (n = 63) 
Sum of 
Squares 
236.10 
1502.12 
D. F. 
3 
59 
Group Statistics 
Mean S.D 
26.57 5.03 
30.19 5.81 
26.52 4.82 
24.55 4.39 
27.11 5.29 
Pearson r = -.24(P = 
Mean 
Square F 
78.70 3.09 
25.46 
N 
7 
16 
29 
11 
63 
.059, N.S.) 
96 
Sig. 
.034 
College Sample: Autonomy and Dominant 
Stage of Moral Development 
The analysis of va.riance relating dominant stage to autonomy 
(refer to Table 9) did not produce a significant F ratio. However, 
the Pearson correlation was significant (r = .24; P = .037) so that 
there appeared to be a linear relationship. Trend analysis was 
computed and the results confirmed a significant linear term with 
quadratic terms being non-significant. Accordingly, it would appear 
that as autonomy increases, the dominant stage of moral development 
increases. Studying the means of the dominant stages one finds an 
inversion between stages two and three with stage two being higher 
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in autonomy than st_age three. Keeping this inversion in mind, it can 
therefore be stated that seemingly the higher the level of autonomy, 
the higher the level of moral development. 
College Sample: Socialization and Dominant 
Stage of Moral Development 
Table 10 reveals that socialization is significantly related 
(F=3.68; P=.Ol6) to th~ dominant stages of moral development for the 
college sample. The Neuman-Keuls procedure reveals that stage three 
subjects are significantly lower in socialization than the principled 
stage s~bjects. Trend analysis indicates a significant linear term 
and non significant quadratic term. Furthermore, significant 
linearity is substantiated by the Pearson correlation (r = .34; P = 
.003) indicating that as socialization increases, dominant stage of 
moral development increases. It should be noted that there is an 
inversion for stages two and three, in that stage two appears to be 
Source 
Between Groups 
Within Groups 
Dominant Stage 
2 
3 
4 
p 
Total 
TABLE 9 
Analysis of Variance: 
Dominant Stage with Autonomy 
for College Sample (n = 73) 
Sum of 
Squares 
32.50 
350.46 
D.F. 
3 
69 
Group Statistics 
Mean S.D. 
9.57 1.72 
8.86 1. 96 
9.70 2.47 
10.54 2.43 
9. 71 2.31 
Pearson r = .24 (P = .037) 
Mean 
Square 
10.83 
5.08 
N 
7 
22 
20 
24 
73 
98 
F Sig. 
2.13 .104 
Source 
Between 
Groups 
Within 
Groups 
Dominant 
Stage 
2 
3 
4 
p 
Total 
TABLE 10 
Analysis of Variance: 
Dominant Stage with Socialization 
for Col.lege Sample (n = 73) 
Sum of Mean 
Squares D. F. Square 
58.35 3 19.45 
364.66 69 5.29 
Group Statistics 
Mean S.D. N 
11.57 3.46 7 
11.23 2.45 22 
12.75 2.27 20 
13.33 1. 74 24 
12.37 2.42 73 
Pearson r = .34 (P = .003) 
99 
F Sig. 
3.68 .016 
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higher in socialization. Accordingly, it would appear that the higher 
the level of socialization, the higher the dominant stage of moral 
development, with the second and third stages being inverted. 
College Sample: Empathy and Dominant 
Stage of ~!oral Development 
Table 11 indicates a significant relationship (F = 2.89; P = 
.042) between empathy and the dominant stages of moral development. 
Neuman-Keuls procedure reveals a significant difference between stage 
two subjects and principled stage subjects with the principled stage 
subjects being significantly higher in empathy. Trend analysis 
indicates a significant linear trend with quadratic term being non 
significant. The Pearson correlation being .29 (P = .014) substanti-
ates a linear trend. Accordingly, the results seemingly indicate that 
the higher the empathy, the higher the dominant stage of moral 
development (with stages three and four being inverted so that subjects 
at stage three were more empathic than stage four subjects). 
College Sample: Summary of Ancillary 
Statistical Results for Hypothesis 1 
The ancillary statistical analyses for hypothesis one, investi-
gating autonomy, socialization, and empathy as separate variables, seem 
to indicate that as autonomy, socialization, and empathy increase for 
the college sample, so does the dominant stage of moral development 
(with stages two and three being inverted for both autonomy and social-
ization and stages three and four being inverted for empathy). The 
results can be characterized by the following general organizing 
Source 
Between 
Groups 
Within 
Groups 
Dominant 
State 
2 
3 
4 
p 
Total 
TABLE 11 
Analysis of Variance: 
Dominant Stage with Empathy 
for College Sample (n = 73) 
Sum of 
Squares 
265.04 
2111.59 
Mean 
22.57 
26.64 
25.95 
29.08 
26.86 
Pearson r 
D. F. 
3 
69 
Group Statistics 
S.D. 
7.57 
5.78 
5.26 
4.86 
5.75 
= .29 (P = .014) 
Mean 
Square 
88.35 
30.60 
N 
7 
22 
20 
24 
73 
101 
F Sig. 
2.89 .042 
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schema: high autonomy + high socialization + high empathy = princi-
pled stage of moral development. 
Hypothesis 2 
The relationship of each of the personality variables, socializa-
tion, autonomy, and empathy, with the assessed dominant stage of moral 
development will not be significantly different at different ages, 
namely, the seventh grade and college ages. Hypothesis two is 
addressed to the following question: Is there a statistically signi-
ficant difference between the relationship of each of the following 
pairs of variables: socialization and dominant stage, autonomy and 
dominant stage, empathy and dominant stage for the two different age 
levels? 
Comparative Data from Hypothesis 1: Table 12 presents data 
comparing Pearson product moment correlation coefficients and their 
significance between assessed dominant stage of moral development and 
each of the personality variables of socialization, autonomy, and 
empathy for the seventh grade and college age levels. From the 
comparative analysis of this data obtained in testing hypothesis one, 
high autonomy appears to be a prerequisite condition for principled 
stage of moral development for the seventh grade age level; while for 
the college age level, high autonomy, high socialization, and high 
empathy appear to be prerequisite conditions for principled moral 
development. Accordingly, it would seem that the relationship between 
socialization, empathy and assessed dominant stage of moral development 
differ at the seventh grade and college age levels, (i.e. in addition 
TABLE 12 
Comparison of Pearson Correlations between 
the Personality Variables and Dominant Stages 
for Seventh Grade and College Samples 
Personality Seventh Grade College Sample 
Variables Sample (n = 63) (n = 73) 
Autonomy Pearson r = .38 r = .24 
p = .002 p = .037 
Socialization Pearson r = .20 r = .34 
P = N.S. p = .003 
Empathy Pearson r = -.24 r = .29 
p = .059 (N.S.) p = .014 
TABLE 13 
Zr Transformations for r for the Two Independent 
Samples, Between Dominant Stage and Autonomy, 
Socialization, and Empathy 
Variables Seventh Grade College Sample 
Sample (n = 63) (n = 73) 
Autonomy and 
Dom. Stage r = .38(P = . 002) r = .24 (P = .037) z p 
Socialization 
and Dom. Stage r = .20 (P= N .S.) r = . 34 (P = .003) z 
p 
Empathy and 
z 
= .88 
= N.S. 
= .86 
= N.S. 
Dom. Stage r = -.24(P = N.S.) r = . 29 (P = .014) z = 3.09 
p < .01 
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to autonomy, principled moral development for the college age sample 
requires high empathy and h_igh socialization). 
Zr Transformation for r Between the Two Independent Age Levels: 
Table 13 presents the Zr transformations,for the independent seventh 
grade and college age samples, between the Pearson correlations 
relating dominant stage to the three personality variables of social-
ization, autonomy, and empathy. It should be noted that the only 
significant difference between the two independent age groups, 
seemingly as a function of age, was between the dominant stage of moral 
development and empathy, Z equaling 3. 09 (P ( . 01). 
Accordingly, even though comparative analysis of the data 
obtained in testing hypothesis one seemed to indicate a difference 
between the relationship of socialization and empathy with dominant 
stage of moral development at both age levels, the statistical analysis 
indicates that only the relationship of empathy with dominant stage is 
significantly different as a function of age. 
Hypothesis 3 
There will not be significant sex differences in socialization, 
autonomy, empathy as related individually to the dominant stage of 
moral development for either the seventh grade or college samples: 
This hypothesis addressed itself to the following questions: (1) Are 
there significant differences between males and females for the three 
personality variables and for the stages of moral development at the 
seventh grade and college levels? (2) Are there significant sex 
differences between the relationship of each of the personality 
variables and the dominant stage of moral development at each age 
level? (3) Is there a statistically significant difference between 
the relationship of autonomy, socialization, and empathy and the 
dominant stage of ~oral development for the independent male and 
female groups at each age level? 
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T Statistic with Sex as the Independent Variable Seventh Grade 
Sample: An analysis of table 14 reveals that what differenti-
ates seventh grade males from seventh grade females in regard to each 
of the three personality variables and dominant stages of moral 
development are: (A) empathy (seventh grade females being signifi-
cantly more empathic (T=2.91; P=.005) than seventh grade males) and 
(B) assessed dominant stage three (T = 3.00; P = .003), (with females 
being significantly at stage three while the seventh grade males were 
s_cattered through out the stages). 
Pearson Correlations Between Personality Variables and Dominant 
Stage for Each Sex Taken Separately - Seventh Grade Sample: 
An examination of table 15 indicates that both males (P = .001) and 
females (P = .035) show a significant relationship between autonomy 
and assessed dominant stage of moral development, and a non 
significant relationship between empathy and assessed dominant stage. 
The relationship between socialization and assessed dominant stage is 
significant for females (P = .006) but not for males. 
T Statistic with Sex as the Independent Variable - College 
Sample: The data presented in table 16 reveals that what 
differentiates college males from college females in regard to each of 
the three personality variables and assessed dominant stages of moral 
development are: (A) empathy (with females being significantly more 
empathic (T=6.42; P=.OOl) than males); (B) socialization (with females 
being significantly more socialized (T=4.25; P=.OOl) than males); 
Variable 
Autonomy 
Socializa-
tion 
Empathy 
Stage 1 
2 
3 
4 
p 
.. '
TABLE 14 
T. Statistic with Sex as the Independent 
Variable; Seventh Grade Sample 
Mean 
Males 
(n = 43) 
Females 
(n = 49) 
7.488 8.082 
9.674 10.388 
25.395 28.429 
Dominant Stage 
17.698 17.016 
16.349 16.592 
15.163 13.082 
14.093 13.286 
14.628 15.020 
T 
.98 
1. 28 
2.91 
* 
** 
.83 
.32 
3.00 
1. 07 
.53 
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Sig. 
.329 
.203 
.005 
.408 
.752 
.003 
.300 
.598 
* The raw statistics are given 
for the dominant stages; so 
that, low = high and 
high = low, since 1 = fully 
accept, 4 = fully reject. 
Unlike the previous tables, 
the data has not been con-
verted. 
** Males n = 25 
Females n= 38 
Personality 
Variable 
Autonomy 
Socializa-
tion 
Empathy 
TABLE 15 
Pearson Correlations Relating the Personality 
Variables and Dominant Stage for Each Sex 
Taken Separately: Seventh Grade Sample 
Pearson r 
Sex Taken Separately 
Males Females 
r = .603 r =.297 
p = .001 p = .035 
r = .129 r = .390 
p = N.S. p = .006 
r = -.162 r = -.126 
p = N.S. p = N.S. 
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Variable 
Autonomy 
Socializa-
tion 
Empathy 
Stage 2 
3 
4 
p 
TABLE 16 
T Statistic with Sex as the Independent 
Variable: College Sample 
Mean 
Males 
(n = 43) 
9.605 
11.605 
23.953 
Dominant 
6.233 
13.907 
18.093 
3.417 
Females T 
(n = 53) 
9.774 .34 
13.415 4.25 
30.094 6.42 
Stage 
3.472 3.97 
10.698 2.62 
16.057 1. 36 
4.243 3.85 
* Males n = 36 
Females n = 37 
108 
Sig. 
.736 
.000 
.000 
.000 
.010 
.176 
.000 
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(C) dominant stage two, three, and principled stage of moral develop-
ment (with males significantly predominating at dominant stage two 
(T=3.97; P=.OOl) and three (T=2.62; P=.Ol) and females significantly 
predominating at the principled stage (T=3.25; P=.OOl). 
Pearson Correlations Between Personality Variables and Dominant 
Stage for Each Sex Taken Separately - College Sample: The 
relationship between autonomy, socialization, and empathy and assessed 
dominant stage, investigating the male and female sample separately, 
is given in table 17. It should be noted that the relationship between 
autonomy, empathy, and assessed dominant stage of moral development is 
not significant for either sex. However, the relationship between 
socialization and dominant stage is significant for the college males 
(P = .024) but not for the college females. 
Zr Transformation for r for Male and Female Subsamples at the 
Seventh Grade and College Levels: Zr transformations (for males 
and females at both age levels) for the Pearson correlation coefficients 
(sex taken separately) relating the three personality variables to the 
dominant stage of moral development are given in table 18. The 
differences between the correlations for males and females were not 
significant in any of the analyses for either the seventh grade or the 
college sample, that is to say, the Zr transformations for r between 
'. 
the Pearson correlations (for the personality variables of autonomy, 
socialization, and empathy related to the dominant stage) did not 
differ significantly either for seventh grade males and females, or 
for college males and females. 
Personality 
Variable 
Autonomy 
Socializa-
tion 
Empathy 
TABLE 17 
Pearson Correlations Relating the Personality 
Variables and Dominant Stage for Each Sex 
Taken Separately: College Sample 
Pearson r 
Sex Taken Separately 
Males (n = 36 ) Females (n = 37) 
r = .288 r = .161 
p = N.S. p = N.S. 
r = .375 r = .009 
p = .024 p = N.S. 
r = .llS r = .089 
p = N.S. p = N.S. 
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Autonomy: 
and Dom. St. 
Socializa-
tion and 
Dom. St. 
Empathy: 
and Dom. 
St. 
TABLE 18 
Zr Transformations for r for Males and Females 
at the Seventh Grade and College Levels 
Seventh Grade College 
Males (n = 25 Females (n = 38) z Males (n = 36 
r = .603 r = .297 z = 1. 49 r = .288 
p = .001 p = .035 P = N.S. P = N.S. 
r = .129 r = .390 z = 1. 44 r = .375 
P = N.S. p = .006 P = N.S. p = .024 
r = .162 r = ;126 z = 1. 09 r = .ll5 
P = N.S. P = N.S. P = N.S. P = N.S. 
Females 
(n = 37) 
r = .161 
P = N.S. 
r = .009 
P = N.S. 
r = .089 
P = N.S. 
z 
--·---
z = .61 
P = N.S. 
z = .37 
P = N.S. 
z = .12 
P = N.S. 
....... 
1-' 
....... 
CHAPTER V 
DISCUSSION 
In this chapter a hypothesis by hypothesis discussion of the 
results will be presented, followed by a more general discussion of 
the data including a consideration of the study's internal and 
external validity. The central portion of this chapter will focus 
on the societal and educational implications of the investigation, 
with the final_section addressing itself to possible future research. 
Hypothesis 1 
Canonical analyses of the data lead to the rejection of the null 
hypothesis, thereby indicating that the personality variables of 
assessed autonomy .• socialization, and empathy (taken as a unit) are 
significantly related to assessed dominant stage of moral development 
for both the seventh grade and college samples. 
The importance of empathy in stage three moral thinking for both 
samples is indicated by the canonical analyses. This result is in 
accordance with cognitive developmental theory in that, by definition, 
stage three moral reasoning views as right that which pleases others 
and is ·approved by them. Empathy, defined as a person's vicarious 
response to another's feelings, connotes that one is able to "stand in 
another person's shoes", not only cognitively but also affectively. 
In such a reciprocal stance, one possesses the capacity to please 
others and by doing so receives their approval. In addition, the 
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canonical analyses indicate that for the college sample, empathy is 
also significantly related to stage SB.. (stage 5~ being the morality of 
intuitive humanism, in contrast to stage 5~, the legalistic morality of 
social contract). By definition, empathy is humanistically oriented, 
so that one would expect the obtained result of high empathy being 
significantly related not only to stage three but also to stage 5~. 
The second canonical correlation revealed that seventh grade 
subjects scoring high on the autonomy and socialization scales~ and 
low on the empathy scale appear to be at the principled stage of moral 
reasoning, while college subjects scoring high in autonomy and 
socialization, and low in empathy appear to be at either stage two or 
stage six of moral development. This result for the college sample 
parallels the Haan study (1971) in which the majority of college 
students who took part in the civil disobedience of "sitting in'' at 
the Berkeley campus were those motivated by stage two or stage six of 
moral reasoning. In a certain sense both stage two and stage six are 
independent of society's norms. The hedonist (stage two) strives for 
pleasure regardless of society's dicta; the absolute principled person 
(stage six) transcends the dicta of society. Viewed from a different 
perspective, it would seem that both stage two and stage six persons 
are doi:ng "their own thing". independent of societal norms: stage two 
subjects motivated bv 
"' 
satisfaction of their personal needs, stage six 
subjects motivated by principles of justice and human rights. 
It should be noted that stage two college students were found to 
be high in the personality variable of socialization; this appears to 
be idiosyncratic. As discussed above, one would not expect stage two 
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subjects to be high on the socialization scale due to the hedonistic 
orientation of stage two. Such an idiosyncratic result begs for an 
explanation. A possible resolution may be had in Kohlberg's (1976) 
recent explanation of a transitional stage between stages four and 
five. (a stage four-and-one-half). The college students labeled as 
stage two moral thinkers, both in the present study and in the Haan 
study, may well have been at this transitional stage. In terms of 
the present investigation, the transitional stage would better account 
for the college subjects being high in socialization. 
Ancillary analyses (analyses of variance and Pearson correla-
tions) of the three personality variables taken separately, as 
related to the dominant stages of moral development, yield for the 
seventh grade sample, the result of autonomy being the only signifi-
cantly linear personality variable (i.e. as autonomy increases, the 
dominant stage of moral development increases). In addition, even 
though empathy did not exhibit a significant linear relationship with 
assessed dominant stage, the Pearson correlation between empathy and 
dominant stage (r =-.24) approached significance (P = .059) so that 
stage three was significantly higher in empathy than the principled 
stage for the seventh grade sample. 
As previously stated the present investigation sought to con-
ceptually integrate Kohlberg's interpretation of moral development with 
Hogan's developmental personality variables. However, one important 
exception must be noted; when Hogan speaks about empathy he is clearly 
describing cognitive empathy; on the other hand, the present study 
views empathy as affective empathy. Hogan claims that mature moral 
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reasoning is characterized by high autonomyJ ~igh socialization, 
and high empathy. The results of the ancillary analyses for the col-
lege sample in the present investigation reveal a similar patternJ in 
that as autonomy, socialization, and empathy increase in intensity, 
the dominant stage of moral development increases (i.e. when the three 
personality variables are investigated separately in relationship to 
dominant stage, principled stage of moral reasoning requires high 
autonomy, high socialization, and high empathy). Accordingly, Hogan's 
thesis receives partial support from the results of the present 
investigation. The support is only partial since Hogan's definition 
and the present investigation's definition of empathy differ. How-
ever, as Feshbach (1975) and Hoffman (1977) have reported, cognitive 
empathy in the usual case, appears to be a necessary but not suffi-
cient condition for affective empathy, the former being the cognitive 
recognition of affect in others, the latter being vicarious, affective 
arousal. 
In summary, the statistical analyses of the data relevant to 
hypothesis one reject the null hypothesis and reveal: (1) the unique 
role of empathy in relation to stage three moral reasoning (for both 
seventh grade and college samples) and stages two, 5!, and six (for 
the coll~ge sample); (2) autonomy as the major variable related to 
dominant stage for the seventh grade sample; and (3) partial support 
for Hogan's thesis that high autonomy, high socialization, and high 
empathy lead to mature moral judgment. 
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Hypothesis 2 
The results of the analyses related to hypothesis two are such 
that the null hypothesis is rejected. The two different age levels 
(seventh grade and college) are significantly differentiated from one 
another by the personality variable of empathy as related to dominant 
stage. Age differences between correlations for autonomy as related 
to dominant stage and socialization as related to dominant stage did 
not significantly differentiate the seventh grade sample from the 
college sample. An investigation of the means for the autonomy and 
socialization scores seemingly indicated age trends. Seventh grade 
males exhibited the lowest mean scores for autonomy and socialization, 
followed by seventh grade females, then college males~ and finally 
college females who exhibited the highest mean scores for both 
measures of autonomy and socialization. However, although such trends 
may be suspected, the present investigation cannot definitively 
establish such trends due to the fact that two different levels of the 
California Test of Personality were used (intermediate level for 
seventh grade sample; secondary level for the college sample) and 
these levels are not strictly comparable. 
All in all, the analyzed data for hypothesis two reject the nul1 
hypothesis and show that empathy as related to dominant stage is 
significantly different for the seventh grade and college samples as a 
result of age. 
Hypothesis 3 
Results related to hypothesis three show significant sex 
differences so that the null hypothesis is rejected. Both seventh 
grade females (T = 2.91; P = .005) and college females (J = 6.42; 
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P = .001) were significantly more empathic than their male counter-
parts. This result supports Hoffman (1977) who reviewed sixteen 
studies dealing with affective empathy and reported that ~egardless of 
age or measure utilized, females obtained higher scores in all sixteen 
studies. Hoffman points out that the probability of females having 
higher scores in sixteen out of sixteen studies is one in sixty-four 
thousand. Investigating sixteen other studies concerning the 
recognition of affect (cognitive empathy), males and females were 
reported to be approximately equal in this cognitive skill. Hoffman 
concludes that in emotional situations both males and females are 
equally adept at assessing how a person feels (recognition of affect) 
but females are more likely to experience the vicarious affect of the 
other person (affective empathy). 
Seventh grade females clustered at stage three (T = 3.00; 
P = .003) while seventh grade males were scattered throughout the 
stages. Such a pattern of scatter during late adolescence may suggest 
a transition period between stage four and stage five involving a 
phase of conflict and disequilibrium (Turiel, 1975); however, such is 
not the case for the seventh grade males who are in the period of late 
preadolescence or early adolescence. 
College females, in addition to being significantly more 
empathic than their male counterparts, were also significantly more 
socialized (T = 4.25; P = .001) and significantly predominated at the 
principled stage (T = 3.85; P = .001). College males significantly 
predominated at stage two (T = 3.97; P = .001) and stage three 
(T = 2.62; P = .01) of moral development. These results seemingly 
stand in opposition to the findings reported by Kohlberg and Kramer 
(1969) who found that adult women stabilize at stage three of moral 
development, while adult males stabilize at stage four. 
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Pearson correlations were computed for each sex separately 
indicating that at the seventh grade level there is a significant 
relationship between autonomy and dominant stage of moral development 
for both sexes; the relationship of socialization with dominant stage 
being significant for females (r = .39; P = .006) but not for seventh 
grade males. At the college level the relationship between socializa-
tion and dominant stage proves to be significant for males (r = .38; 
P = .024) but not for college females. 
Post factum partial correlational analyses controlling for sex 
(i.e. variability due to sex being partialed_ out) show that for 
seventh grade sample, autonomy related to dominant stage is signifi-
cantly associated (r = .43; P = .001); empathy is not (r = -.15; 
P = .124). However when variability due to sex is taken into account 
we have seen that empathy approaches significance (r =-.24; P = .059). 
Socialization is significantly related to dominant stage when varia-
bility due to sex is partialed out (r = .28; P = .013) but becomes non 
significant when sex variability is taken into account (r = .20; 
p = .107). 
For the college sample, partialling out variability due to sex, 
reveals that autonomy and socialization are significantly related to 
dominant stage (r = .22; P = .033; r = .22; P = .033 respectively), 
with empathy related to dominant stage being non significant (r = .04; 
P = .379), but becoming significant when variability due to sex is 
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taken into account (r = .29; P = .014). 
Accordingly, when variability due to sex is taken into account, 
empathy as related to dominant stage becomes significant (college 
sample) or approaches significance (seventh grade sample), and 
socialization as related to dominant stage becomes non significant for 
the seventh grade sample. Autonomy for both samples and socialization 
for the college sample are significantly related to the dominant 
stage of moral development independently of sex variability (i.e. when 
variability due to sex is partialled out or when it is taken into 
account). 
An investigation of the analyzed data for hypothesis three 
indicates that the means for affective empathy do not reveal age 
trends but show the following pattern: college males being lowest in 
empathic scores, followed by seventh grade males, then seventh grade 
females, with college females being highest in empathic scores. 
Focusing on dominant stage of moral development the following 
statistically significant pattern of results is obtained: seventh 
grade males being scattered through out the stages, college males 
predominating at stage two and three, seventh grade females clustering 
at stage three, and college females being mostly at the principled 
stage. From these analyses, college males appear low in both level of 
affective empathy and dominant stage of moral development. An explan-
ation of this seemingly idiosyncratic phenomenon is found in the 
construct of adolescent egocentrism in that a substantial number of 
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the college male subjects appeared to be going through the period of 
adolescent egocentrism .• while the female college sample apparently had 
overcome this developmental challenge. This phenomenon appears to be 
partially a function of the college sample used in the present investi-
gation. The male college subjects as a group appeared to be in the 
lower half of their high school graduating class and had not made a 
definite choice for future career plans. In contrast, the female 
group was in the upper half of their graduating class and as a group 
had definite career plans. 
Adolescent egocentrism, according to Inhelder and Piaget (1958), 
occurs at the time that formal operational thought is developing. The 
adolescent is primarily concerned with himself assuming that others are 
as concerned with his appearance and behavior as he is. This assump-
tion constitutes the egocentrism of adolescence. Accordingly, the 
young person is continually reacting to an imaginary audience (Elkind, 
1974), in that he believes that he will be the center of attention 
(audience) \vhich usually is not the case (imaginary). While the young 
person fails to differentiate the concerns of his thought and the 
thoughts of others, he simultaneously over differentiates his own feel-
ings, regarding his feelings as specifically unique and special. 
Progressing through the period of adolescent egocentrism, the 
young person focuses on his needs and feelings 1 distorting what is 
pleasing to others. Having such an orientation, it \vould seem that the 
person would be low in affective empathy and would be at stage two of 
moral development. Therefore, it is reasonable to conclude in the 
present investigation that the college males who were going through 
the period of adolescent egocentrism were those lvho were significantly 
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low in affective empathy and at dominant stage two of moral develop-
ment. 
Kohlberg's longitudinal data revealed an idiosyncratic result in 
that some college students shifted from stage four to stage two 
rather than making direct progression to stage five (Kohlberg and 
Kramer, 1969; Kramer, 1968). This would seemingly contradict the 
sequential invariance of the stages. However, Kohlberg explains this 
shift by viewing it as a transition between stage four and stage five, 
a stage four-and-one-half, since these subjects eventually progressed 
to stage five. Kohlberg (1976) states that the social perspective of 
stage four-and-one-half is clearly different from stage tlvo in that 
subjects in the transitional stage questioned society and viewed them-
selves from an outside of society perspective. This view was in 
contrast to stage two subjects who view things as concrete individuals 
"relating to other individuals through concrete reciprocity, exchange, 
and utilities?" (P. 43). 
The college males at stage two, in the present investigation, may 
well be in this transitional stage four-and-one-half. From the 
present analyses the data is suggestive of such a possibility in that 
the Pearson correlations relating socialization to dominant stage of 
moral development for each sex separately reveals that the college 
males show a significant relationship (r = .38; P = .024) while the 
college females do not. It may be argued that the college males' 
social perspective may well be different from the individualistic 
perspective of the stage two hedonistic orientation (i.e. one \vould not 
expect a significant relationship between socialization and stage two). 
However, without further longitudinal data for the college male sub-
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jects, no definite conclusion is possible at this time. 
To recapitulate, the analyses of the data for hypothesis three 
reject the null hypothesis and show: (1) significant sex differences 
in affective empathy with seventh grade and college females being more 
empathic than their male counterparts; (2) significantly higher social-
ization scores for college females than for college males: (3) pre-
dominance of seventh grade females at stage three_. with seventh grade 
males being scattered through out the stages; (4) significant cluster-
ing of college females at the principled stage, with college males pre-
dominating at stages two and three; (5) the importance of variability 
due to sex (for each sex separately and with variability due to sex 
partialled out); and (6) the seemingly idiosyncratic phenomenon of 
college males being low in empathy and in dominant stage of moral 
development. 
Theoretical Discussion of Four Dimensions of Character Structure 
Related to Moral Development 
Having completed a hypothesis by hypothesis discussion of the 
results obtained in the present investigation, we will now turn our 
attention to a more general discussion of: (1) how cultural socializa-
tion patterns may account for sex differences in the development of 
affective empathy; (2) the importance of autonomy in mature moral 
developJllent; and (3) the relationship of intelligence to moral develop-
ment. In other words, four dimensions of character structure (social-
ization, empathy, autonomy, I.Q.) having a reported relationship to 
moral development (Hogan 1973, 1975) will be theoretically discussed, 
Socialization Patterns and Affective Empathy: Although 
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socialization and empathy are separate and independent constructs, 
the traditional socialization patterns for males and females seem to 
play an important part in the development of affective empathy. 
Parsons and Bales (1955) and Johnson (1963) distinguish between two 
roles in any social unit, the expressive and the instrumental. In 
American society females have been traditionally socialized to perform 
the expressive role in the family unit, a role in which the female is 
responsive to the needs and feelings of others in order to maintain 
the family as an intact, harmonious unit. In contrast~ males are 
socialized to perform the instrumental role, acti.ng as liaisons be-
tween the family unit and other social institutions, especially 
occupational institutions. Initially males are socialized expressively 
but with age are encouraged to acquire instrumental traits such as 
mastery and problem solving. It is possible that male socialization 
practices produce males who are action oriented toward instrumental, 
ameliorative action in affective situations. That is to say, having 
recognized the affect of another, the male may be considering action 
alternatives rather than empathizing in these situations. Hoffman 
(1975a) and Hogan (1973, 1975) discuss the possibility that humans may 
have an innate empathic predisposition. On the other hand, infant 
girls appear to be more likely to cry than infant boys in response to 
another child's cry (Simner, 1971; Sagi and Hoffman, 1976). Such cry-
ing may suggest the possibility of a constitutional predisposition in 
females that together with differences in socialization patterns 
account for later sex differences in empathy. In either case (innate 
general predisposition or female predisposition), the capacity for 
affective empathy seems to be actualized through the different 
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socialization patterns for males and females. 1 
Hogan (1973) reports that interviews with subjects who received 
very high scores on his cognitive empathy scale syggest that they often 
suffer from an excess of role taking in that they are "too concerned 
with the expectations of others~ they excessively inhibit hostility 
and aggression, and suffer from identity diffusion" (p. 224). If 
Hogan's caveat is correct in regard to cognitive empathy, how does it 
relate to affective empathy? The present study has shown that high 
empathy in combination with high levels of socialization and autonomy 
is significantly related with principled moral development. Thereby, 
the personality variable of empathy, like those of socialization and 
autonomy, can not be viewed in isolation when moral development is 
considered. An excess in any one of the personality variables without 
a corresponding regulation by the other two personality variables may 
well lead to anomalies of the personality. 
The Import of Autonomy in Mature Moral Development: Socializa-
tion and empathy as related to moral developmental stages reflect a 
utilitarian bias in that compliance is given to social norms based on 
the larger welfare of society or on self interest. Kant (i933 Trans.) 
argues that such compliance is in no way moral and that the truly moral 
person has an autonomous will and is governed by a personal sense of 
duty. An adequate description of moral development requires the 
1Traditional socialization patterns are more and more being dis-
carded in the United States. Male and female roles in some quarters 
are being reversed. Time and research wi 11 tell us the effect of 
these non traditional socialization patterns. 
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personality variable of autonomy. A well socialized and empathic 
person might be the model citizen in his conformity to societal norms 
but may act immorally. The example often given is that the person who 
complied with the collective societal norms of Hitler's Germany \VOuld 
be complying to and justifying the execution of innocent Jews. 
Autonomy serves to insulate one from the potential irnnorality of 
collective compliance and to facilitate non conformist prosocial be-
havior. However, an autonomous person who is unsocialized and non-
empathic is likely to be autocratic and non conformist for non-
conformity's sake. Accordingly, as mentioned previously, the 
personality variables of socialization, empathy, and autonomy cannot 
be viewed in isolation. Results of hypothesis one revealed that at 
the seventh grade level, autonomy was the significant variable in 
relation to dominant stage of moral development (i.e. as autonomy 
increased, dominant stage of moral development increased). However, 
in no way does this result suggest that the seventh grade subjects 
were unsocialized and nonempathic. In fact, additional analyses 
revealed that fe~ale seventh grade subjects were more empathic and 
predominately at a higher stage of moral development than seventh 
grade and college males. 
Relationship of Intelligence to Moral Development: For a person 
to understand basic issues in moral situations a certain degree of 
moral knowledge is needed. Hogan (1973, 1975) operationalizes the 
construct of moral knowledge by equating its measurement with tests 
of general intelligence. Correlation coefficients between intelligence 
and moral development have generally been reported to be in the 30s 
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(Hogan, 1973). In the present study I. Q. scores were available for 
only the seventh grade subjects. 1 Pearson correlational coefficients: 
(1) between dominant stage of moral development and I.Q. were r = .33, 
P = .009; (2) between autonomy and I.Q. r = .16, P = .125; (3) 
between socialization and I.Q. r = .14. P .173; and (4) between 
empathy and I.Q. r = -.34, P = .001. Hogan (1973) reports a correla-
tion coefficient of . 30 between l. Q. and autonomy and reports that 
cognitive empathy correlates between .30 and .50 with several 
measures of intellectual performance. However, the present study 
shows a much lower correlation between I.Q. and autonomy and a signifi-
cant negative correlation between affective empathy and I.Q. for the 
seventh grade sample. The results of the present study are consistent 
in that there is a negative correlation between affective empathy and 
dominant stage of moral development but a positive significant 
correlation between I.Q. and dominant stage. Accordingly, the correla-
tion between I.Q. and empathy is negative for the seventh grade 
sample. In addition, the present investigation is consistent with 
previous reports in that the correlation between I.Q. and dominant 
stage of moral development is in the 30s. 
Statements Supporting Internal and External Validity 
The present inquiry sought to support internal validity by 
utilizing the following criteria: valid and reliable instrumentation; 
1The measure of general intelligence available for the seventh 
grade sample was the Short Test of Educational Ability (S.T.E.A.) 
obtained from Science Research Associates. 
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objective scoring; selection of subjects; careful examination of all 
protocols; control of reading ability and verbal expressivity. 
Autonomy and socialization were measured by the self reliance 
and social standards subtests of the California Test of Personality, 
. appropriate levels being used for the seventh grade and college 
subjects. The stringent criteria, in terms of logical analyses, 
experience, judgments of clinical and educational psychologists as 
well as teachers, and statistical analyses, in the construction of the 
test (with validity studies) point to well established validity. 
Reliability coefficients at the intermediate and secondary levels for 
the measurement of autonomy and socialization are in the 70s or above. 
Since the computed reliability coefficient for the seventh 
grade subjects was in the 50s on the Nehrabian-Epstein affective 
empathy scale (1972), a revised scale was utilized producing a Cronbach 
(1951) alpha reliability coefficient of .63 for the seventh grade 
subjects and .78 for the college subjects. Due to its recency, the 
original scale has not been extensively used. However, content 
validity has been inferred in part from factor analysis and initial 
studies have supported the validity of the scale. 
Until recently, the only available technique for measuring levels 
of moral development was the free response method of Kohlberg. 
Several attempts have been made at the objective measurement of moral 
stages, the one with the most extensive replication and longitudinal 
analysis being the Defining Issues Test (Rest, 1972). As previously 
reported, the correlation between the Defining Issues Test (D.I.T.) and 
Kohlberg's free response method is .68 (Rest, 1974). · The D.I.T. has 
been used with over fifteen hundred subjects with reliability reported 
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as ranging between .65 to .81 depending on the age and educational 
status of the subjects. The Carroll Test of Moral Development (1974) 
has been developed as a downward extension of the D.I.T. The Carroll 
Test is acceptable for use with fifth grade subjects and above \vhile 
Rest (1974) cautions that the D.I.T. is not appropriate for subjects 
below the eleventh grade. Although Carroll's measure has neither 
extensive replication nor longitudinal examination, the theoretical 
base of the Carroll Test and initial pilot studies (Carroll, 1974) 
appear sufficiently respectable in terms of reliability and validity 
considering the present immature state of moral development assessment. 
The use of objective instruments rather than of a free response 
intervie\v gave significant control of subjects' verbal and expressive 
abilities while the use of strict objective scoring criteria controlled 
investigator bias and eliminated the need for inter~rater reliability. 
Incomplete and unreliable protocols were eliminated according to the 
reliability criteria given by Rest (1974). Reading ability for the 
seventh grade sample \vas controlled by reading aloud the items while 
the subjects followed a written copy. Sample selection was based on 
theoretical considerations presented in the literature (Kohlberg and 
Kramer, 1969) stating that the selected age levels were critical 
periods for the attainment of principled moral development in adulthood. 
In considering external validity or generalizability,the extensive 
standardization and norming of the California Test of Personality must 
be taken into account. Seventh grade subjects were chosen randomly from 
a greater number of seventh grade students in the same school. College 
subjects were a sample of convenience, necessitated by the inability of 
the investigator to obtain a large college population from \vhich to 
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choose a randomized sample of one hundred subjects matched for sex. 
A logical analysis of the alternate hypotheses for the present 
inquiry leads to "strong inferences" (Platt, 1964) of a general nature. 
The review of research reported by Hoffman (1977) has shown that 
females are more affectively empathic than males. The results of the 
present investigation support Hoffman's findings. Accordingly, a 
strong inference can be made from the present results that generally, 
junior high and college females will be more empathic than their male 
counterparts. 
From a logical analysis of the characteristics of the stages of 
moral development and the definitions of the developmental personality 
variables, the assumptions relating the stages and the personality 
variables might be as follows: (1) persons at stage two would appear 
to be highly autonomous, poorly socialized, and non empathic; (2) 
those at stage three would be highly empathic, poorly socialized and 
lacking in autonomy; (3) those predominating at stage four would seem 
to be highly socialized, non autonomous and empathic; (4) those at the 
principled stage seemingly would be well socialized~ empathic, and 
autonomous. Results of the present investigation provide support for 
the logical assumptions concerning stage three and the principled 
stage. 
It can be logically assumed that a person in the period of 
adolescent egocentrism would be less empathic and at a lower stage of 
moral development than an adolescent who has passed through this period. 
Empirical support is given to this logical assumption by the inferred 
results of the present study. However, it can not be generalized that 
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college males will be lower in moral development than females because 
in a sample of college students from a different population~ the 
raales might not be undergoing the period of egocentrism which was a 
peculiar characteristic of the college sample used in the present 
study. 
Wl1en one is concerned with the generalizability of results the 
issue of ecological representativeness must be taken into account. The 
theoretical foundation on which the present investigation is built 
assumes that all people go through the same sequential~ invariant 
stages of moral development, i.e. heredity provides the general 
capacity. In terms of universal general capacity, it can be logically 
inferred that the present study theoretically \vould seem to be 
representative of all human beings. However, this capacity will not 
become actualized without proper interaction with the environment. 
The question of ecological representativeness seems to be the question 
of "will the interaction with the environment produce the necessary 
moral conflict so that the person may advance from the capacity to the 
actualization of higher stages of moral development?'' In terms of 
actualization of capacity, the present study is limited by the environ-
mental forces that have interacted with the subjects utilized in the 
sample~. 
Societal - Educational Implications of the Present Inquiry 
The results of the present investigation have implications for 
many societal units such as the family, the school, and the church. 
These societal units will .be discussed in the followi_ng section. 
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The Family: A growing body of research has been directed toward 
the developmental antecedents of personality variables and parenting 
practices in the development of personality variables. Since it is 
strongly inferred from the present study that the personality variables 
of empathy, socialization, and autonomy are significant variables in 
the developmental growth of moral thinking, a brief summary of the 
relationship of the developmental antecedents for each personality 
variable and parenting practices will be presented. 
Empathy 
As has been stated previously, the socialization practices for 
boys and girls take different paths in that girls are socialized to 
perform an expressive role (being responsive to the needs and feelings 
of others) while boys are socialized to perform an instrumental role 
(mastery, problem solving, liaison between the family and occupational 
society). The development of affective empathy seems to be related 
to these different roles of socialization, so that females, as a rule, 
are more empathic than males (see Hoffman, 1977). However, there is a 
strong movement in America today advocating that both boys and girls be 
socialized expressively as well as instrumentally. Such familial and 
extra familial expectations would have far reaching consequences 
especially for the development of empathic persons, since there is a 
growing amount of literature supporting the notion that empathic 
tendencies or predispositions may be innate (see Hogan, 1973). 
Role taking is an indispensible precursor of empathy in that the 
person is required to adopt another's perspective in the awareness and 
recognition of the other's feelings. Hoffman (1976) states, "the 
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rudiments of role taking competency may be present before the child is 
two years old." (p, 138). Since role taking is a learned skill, 
parents can facilitate its acquisition by using daily real life situa-
tions of conflict and asking their child to reflect on how does he 
think the other person feels. Using such a parenting technique will 
also afford the child practice in developing this skip. 
A state of \vell being and need fulfillment may well be necessary 
conditions for the development of the empathic response in that 
pressures of egoistic concerns are reduced, permitting the person to 
be more open and responsive to the feelings of others. Warm, 
nurturant, democratic and empathic parents appear to serve as signifi-
cant models for their child in the development of empathy. 
Socialization 
The relationship of the socialization processes to empathy for 
boys and girls in terms of instrumental and expressive roles has been 
discussed above. Research directed toward the developmental anteced-
ents of socialization has sho\m that warm, nurturant, accepting and 
consistently restrictive parents tend to produce the most socialized 
children. Successful socialization involves an exchange in which the 
child gives up his desire to do as he pleases and begins to internalize 
familial and societal norms. However, for the child to become social-
ized, he must have some confidence in his ability to deal effectively 
with his environment. 
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Autonomy 
Early development of c_ognitive and verbal skills and interest in 
school achievement enhance a child's self esteem and self confidence, 
while self esteem and self confidence appear as necessary precursors 
of autonomy. Although a high degree of self reliance is not developed 
until later in life, the early period of life appears to be most 
important in the child's development of autonomy. Parents must respect 
the child's right to choose so that the young child can make choices. 
The young child has a need to explore and investigate his environment. 
An overprotective parent may be warm and nurturant when the child is an 
infant but when the child shows signs of independence, the parent 
becomes restrictive and overly cautious. Parenting practices of 
acceptance, warmth, nurturance, reasonable permissiveness in respect 
to the child's exploring, manipulating, and investigating, democratic 
exercise of parental power, explanation of reasons for parental rules 
and expectations, encouragement of discussion and verbal give and take, 
and avoidance of arbitrary decisions in that certain behaviors are 
clearly labeled as permitted and other behaviors as forbidden, foster 
autonomy. The child is provided by such parenting practices with 
opportunities for self reliant behavior and can receive parental 
guidance and control. ln addition, such practices promote the child's 
identification with the parents based on love and respect and the 
parents themselves become primary models for responsible autonomy 
(see Baumrind, 1971). It should be noted that warm, nurturant, 
accepting and consistently restrictive parents produce the most 
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socialized children while less restrictive parents foster autonomy. 
The maxim "in medio virtus stat" applies here as in many other situa-
tions. Too much empathy may lead to identity diffusion, too much 
socialization may lead to blind conformity to societal demands, too 
much autonomy may lead to non conformity for non conformity's sake. 
Accordingly, a mixture of these variables tends to lead to balance 
and mature moral development. 
Cognitive - Moral Development 
Since cognitive and moral development are apparently stimulated 
by cognitive conflict, a democratic milieu whereby verbal discussion is 
encouraged in the home will facilitate cognitive and moral growth. At 
close inspection, many of the parental practices associated with the 
developmental antecedents of autonomy appear to be necessary but not 
sufficient conditions for moral discussion and facilitation of moral 
conflict. These antecedents are necessary but not sufficient conditions 
since parents need to be familiar with the developmental aspects of 
cognitive and moral growth. "Do what I say and not what I do" can only 
confuse the child since the child is looking to the parents to 
provide models for his behavior. 
All that has been said concerning the family, points to the task 
of educ~ting parents to new modes of parenting. Many high schools 
offer courses concerning parenting where the young person receives his 
first exposure to necessary parenting skills. Many parents-to-be 
attend prenatal classes and it is suggested that these classes could 
extend their scope and include parenting skills as part of the educa-
tional process at a time when the future parents would seem most open 
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to such education. The local schools and community colleges could 
offer workshops or classes for parents to help them develop necessary 
parenting skills for the facilitation of empathy, socialization, and 
autonomy and moral growth in their children. 
The School: The traditional adage that the schools stand "in 
loco parentis'·' still holds true today. What has been said concerning 
parenting practices applies to effective teacher practices in the 
schools. In addition, teachers can serve as important models for their 
learners. 
It is during the "critical years" of elementary and high school 
that the young person will advance in moral development toward 
principled moral reasoning or stabilize at a lower stage. It is the 
avoidance of this stabilization at a lower level of moral development 
that teachers with the help of moral developmental psychologists must 
address themselves. Since cognitive development is a necessary but not 
sufficient condition for moral development, a young person that does 
not reach full formal operational thinking will not reach the principled 
level of moral development. If such is the case, the young person still 
has the right of receiving such experiences that will actualize what-
ever limited capacity that he possesses. Crucial to developmental 
growth is the updating of teacher training through inservice sessions, 
additional course work, or a program of guided reading and discussion. 
Schools might do well to investigate Kohlberg's concept of a 
"just community school" which involves making moral discussion an 
integral part of the curriculum. The theory behind such a concept is 
postulated on a participatory democracy which stresses.that solution of 
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school problems are had in a community meeting using the moral 
discussion process. The assumption is that higher moral reasoning 
will prevail in these discussions. Real life moral situations and 
actions are treated as issues of fairness and as matters for 
democratic discussion. A school where the students participate in 
democratic solutions to problems offers extensive'opportunities for 
role taking. Since moral discussion is written into the curriculum 
(and necessary teacher training is given) small group moral discussion 
precedes the democratic decision making meetings. A rotating student 
body serves as a discipline committee. Such a democratic school 
presents a social system of fairness and reasonableness but this is 
not its primary purpose. Rather Kohlberg sees the democratic process 
as a vehicle for moral discussion and the cause of an emerging sense 
of community (see Kohlberg, 1972, 1975; Kohlberg and Turiel, 1971). 
Such schools can thus become vital democratic forces in the community 
and through workshops and discussion groups addressed to parents, can 
function as change agents in offering these parents an opportunity to 
acquire necessary skills for fostering cognitive and moral growth. 
The lyrics of popular music often appeal to all ages so that they 
can be a most relevant and poignant vehicle for moral discussion. A 
present day popular hit has the songstress singing 11 ••• it can't be 
wrong when it feels so right"1 clearly an espousal of stage two 
hedonistic morality. In sharp contrast to this hedonistic orientation 
1From the song "You Light Up My Life" sung by Debby Boone and 
chosen as the best single record for the year 1977. 
are the lyrics from the sone "Alfie": 
What's it all about Alfie? Is it just for the moment 
we live? What's it all about when you sort it out? ... 
Are we meant to take more than we give, or are we meant 
to be kind? And if only fools are kind, Alfie, then I 
guess it is wise to be cruel. And if life only belongs 
to the strong ... what will you lend on an old golden 
rule? As sure as I believe there's a heaven above, Alfie, 
I know there's something much more ... (David, 1966) 
The lyrical rendition of Harry Chapin's "Cats in the Cradle," 
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certainly will create cognitive if not moral conflict concerning the 
responsibility of the parent as a primary model for their children. 
Using popular music, movies, television programs, selected 
literature etc. in the classroom as vehicles for moral discussion will 
bring the world of the young person in direct confrontation with moral 
issues that are relevant to the person's everyday life. 
The Church: In a world of scientific and technological 
"miracles," a world preoccupied with materialistic concerns and with 
the emergence of the so called "new morality," a stage two morality of 
self gratification and hedonistic pursuits, the churches stand in a 
unique position of not only proclaiming the "good news" but of being 
vital agents of moral conflict motivating their membership to higher 
stages of moral development. The scriptural readings in themselves are 
potent forces for creation of moral conflict; take for instance the 
incident of Abraham willing to sacrifice his son, Isaac (Genesis 22, 
1-14); or the words of Jesus at his impending death, "Greater love than 
this no one has, that one lay down his life for his friends. This is 
my commandment that you love one another as I have loved you'' 
(John 15, 13 & 12); or the beatitudes (Matthew 5, 3-11). 
In addition to having responsibility of creating moral conflict 
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in their members and proclaiming the "good news," the churches have 
the responsibility of aiding their members in the formation of an 
"informed conscience." For in the final analysis.it is not the 
rules and/or religious practices that determine the goodness of an 
action, but the person's individual "informed conscience." 
When the congregation is small, moral dilemmas can be presented 
with congregational discussion. Sermons would have to be geared to 
different ages of the congregation; theoretically, it would be a safe 
assumption that most adult parishioners would be at the conventional 
level of moral development. 
Research Implications 
The present inquiry being an ex post facto study and utilizing 
multivariate correlational analyses strongly inferred that the person-
ality variables of autonomy, socialization, and empathy were signifi-
cantly related to levels of moral development with significant age and 
sex differences being found at the two different age levels. 
Systematic replicative investigations utilizing stratified age-grade 
samples selected from varied populations would be desirable in terms 
of confirming or questioning generalizability of the present study. 
An inquiry utilizing other instrumentation for measurement of autonomy, 
socialization, and empathy while retaining the instrumentation used 
for the measurement of moral development could provide important 
confirming or disconfirming results. In such a study the definitions 
of the personality variables must remain the same as given in the 
present investigation. The need for longitudinal studies in the 
investigation of moral development is apparant from the foregoing 
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discussion. The author intends to annually assess autonomy, socializa-
tion, empathy, and moral development of the seventh grade subjects 
included in the present study as part of a continued longitudinal 
investigation. The primary aim of this additional study will be to 
investigate the invariant sequentiality and irreversibility of the 
stages and to investigate the function of the personality variables 
as age and moral development increase. 
The magnitude of empathic arousal seems to be affected by the 
similarity or dissimilarity between the observer and the observed 
(Feshbach and Roe, 1968; Krebs, 1975; Hoffman, 1977). The Kohlberg, 
Rest, and Carroll dilemmas clearly specify gender and infer age. 
Retaining the basic issues of the dilemmas \vi th all cues of gender 
and age being removed (as far as possible) theoretically should 
refine the dilemmas. A comparative investigation utilizing the 
original (gender-age cued) and modified (non gender-age cued) 
dilemmas could produce interesting results. 
Hogan (1973) has found that subjects that were highly empathic 
appeared to be suffering from identity diffusion and showed excessive 
inhibition of aggression and hostility. Additional research seems to 
be warranted especially with stage three subjects in order to inves-
tigate possible identity diffusion and excessive inhibition of 
aggressive and hostile tendencies. Since the stage at which a person 
operates renders the reason, the motive for his "moral" action, an 
investigation of motivational theories as related to the various 
stages of moral development and the personality variables of interest 
could produce perspicacious results. For instance, a purely hedo-
nistic theory of human motivation would seem to espouse a stage two 
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morality and possibly a highly autonomous orientation with low 
socialization and low empathic orientation. 
The relationship of autonomy, empathy, and socialization to ego 
development as well as the relationship between ego and moral develop-
ment would seem to be fertile fields for continuing research. Even 
though Kohlberg views ego development as a necessary but not sufficient 
condition for moral development, additional research seems necessary to 
provide further theory articulation. 
Another area of potential research would be an investigation of 
Maslow's hierarchy of needs and levels of socialization, autonomy, 
empathy and moral development, since the satisfaction of a given need 
stage may be prerequisite for attainment of a corresponding moral 
stage. 
The present investigation indexed moral development by the 
exceptional usage of a particular stage. Other means of indexing 
moral development are: indexing by highest stage of substantial use 
in which the highest stage at which a subject produces at least twenty 
percent of his responses is chosen as the stage of substantial usage 
(Rest, 1976); indexing by the stage of predominant usage at which fifty 
percent or more of the responses occur. Further research appears to 
be needed regarding the comparative usefulness of the various indices 
. 
of moral development. 
Continued research investigating age and sex trends in the 
development of autonomy, socialization, empathy, and moral reasoning 
seems to be warranted. Interesting research could be done in the 
consideration of levels of autonomy, socialization, empathy and moral 
development in relation to diverse occupations and professions such as 
Ml 
Candee's pilot study (1977) which reported that one of the dimensions 
differentiating principled stage physicians fron1 their lower stage 
colleagues was the personality variable of affective empathy. 
Additional research is called for in order to clarify Kohlberg's 
transitional stage four-and-one-half. This research would. require 
longitudinal data and must address itself to the social perspective of 
each stage of moral development. 
Another research area suggested by the present inquiry would be 
the relationship of teachers' levels of autonomy, socialization, 
empathy, and moral development and classroom climate as perhaps 
assessed by Flanders' interaction analysis method (Amidon and 
Flanders, 1971). One could also investigate the effect of teacher 
training (regarding conditions that facilitate autonomy, socialization, 
empathy, and moral development in their students) on student growth in 
these areas. An additional research question could be: does such 
training act as a change agent for the teachers themselves? Various 
methods of training could be utilized (such as discussion, lecture etc.) 
and the efficacy of training methods in producing change could be 
compared. 
Finally, assessing levels of autonomy, socialization, empathy, 
and stage of moral development in active church goers (defined as 
those who attend Sunday services at least three times a month) who are 
differentiated by intrinsic religious motivation in contrast to 
extrinsic religious motivation would appear to be an interesting area 
for research. Intrinsic religious motivation has been operationalized 
by the scale developed by Hoge (1972). 
To recapitulate, the research implications of the present 
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investigations are many, namely: (1) systematic replication studies, 
(2) utilization of different instrumentation for autonomy, socializa-
tion, and empathy, (3) continued longitudinal studies, (4) reduction 
of gender and age cues in the moral dilemmas, (5) investigation of 
possible identity diffusion in stage three subjects, (6) investigation 
of motivational theories as related to moral development and person-
ality variables, (7) relating personality variables to ego development, 
(8) continued research concerning the relationship between ego and 
moral development, (9) investigation of Maslow's hierarchy of needs 
and levels of autonomy, socialization, empathy, and moral development, 
(10) indexing moral development by highest stage of substantial usage 
and/or predominant stage of usage, (11) continued research regarding 
age and sex trends in the development of the personality variables and 
moral development, (12) utilizing diverse occupations and professions 
in investigating levels of autonomy, socialization, empathy, and moral 
development, (13) continued research concerning Kohlberg's transi-
tional stage four-and-one-half, (14) relating teachers' level of 
autonomy, socialization, empathy, and moral development to classroom 
climate, (15) effect of teacher training in moral development on 
student moral growth, (16) investigation of training in moral develop-
ment discussion as a change agent for the trainee, (17) investigation 
of levels of the personality variables and stage of moral development 
in church goers differentiated by intrinsic as opposed to extrinsic 
religious motivation. 
These research possibilities have arisen from the investigator's 
frame of reference, a different frame of reference could produce many 
other implications for research. All in all, the present investigation 
can be of significant heuristic value. 
CHAPTER VI 
SUMMARY 
The investigation sought to study the relationship between 
Kohlberg's stages of moral development and the developmental person-
. . 
ality variables of autonomy, socialization, and empathy proposed by 
Hogan as necessary for mature moral development with one major 
difference. Empathy as defined by Hogan refers to cognitive empathy 
(the cognitive awareness and recognition of another's feelings); 
empathy as defined in the present study refers to affective empathy 
(the vicarious sharing of another's feelings). 
Two critical age periods (preadolescence and late adolescence) 
suggested in the Kohlbergian literature were selected for investigation. 
Ninety two Caucasian seventh grade students from a suburban Chicago 
public school were randomly assigned to the preadolescent group. 
Ninety six Caucasian students from a suburban Chicago junior college 
were assigned to the late adolescent group. Each group was balanced 
for sex differences. Subtests of the "California Test of Personality" 
were utilized to assess socialization and autonomy; affective autonomy 
was ass~ssed by a modified scale of the "Mehrabian-Epstein Empathy 
Scale." ~1oral development was measured by the "Carroll Test of Moral 
Reasoning" for the seventh grade subjects and by the "Defining Issues 
Test of Moral Reasoning" for the college subjects. 
The results indicated that the three personality variables of 
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autonomy, socialization and empathy (_taken as a unit) were signifi-
cantly related to dominant stage of moral development. However, when 
the personality variables were investigated separately,, autonomy was 
the only variable showing a statistically significant linear relation-
ship for the seventh grade sample. In contrast, for the college 
sample, as autonomy, socialization, and empathy scores· increased, the 
dominant stage of moral development also increased. This result of 
mature-principled moral development requiring high autonomy, high 
socialization, and high empathy, partially confirmed Hogan's hypothesis. 
Empathy significantly differentiated the t\-TO age groups, and 
significant sex differences were obtained. Seventh grade males were 
differentiated from seventh grade females by, (1) empathy (females 
being significantly more empathic than males) and (2) dominant stage 
(with females significantly clustering at stage three, while males were 
scattered throughout the stages). College males were differentiated 
from college females in that, (I) females were significantly more 
empathic, (2) females were significantly more socialized, and (3) 
males significantly predominated at stages two and three, while females 
significantly clustered at the principled stage. Females in both _age 
groups were more empathic than their male counterparts. This finding 
was discussed in terms of socialization patterns and Hoffman's dis-
tinction between cognitive and affective empathy. The present study 
seemingly stands in opposition to findings reported by Kohlberg and 
Kramer who found that adult females stabilize at stage three while 
adult males stabilize at stage four. 
The seemingly idiosyncratic result of college males being low in 
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affective empathy and in dominant stage of moral development was 
discussed in terms of the peculiarity of the chosen sample, Piaget's 
concept of adolescent egocentrism, and Kohlberg's transitional stage 
four-and-one-half. 
Societal and educational implications were applied to the 
family, the school, and the church. Implications for future research 
were presented. 
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EPILOGUE 
Maslow (1970) states that he believes that "the ultimate disease 
of our time is valuelessness" (p. 82). Kristol (1974) has pointed out 
that Western Civilization in general, and the United States, in 
particular, are at present experiencing a crisis in values. Frankl 
(1972) has referred to the state of man characterized by feelings of 
emptiness, boredom, valuelessness, and meaninglessness, as "the 
existential vacuum" and believes that this vacuum has become ubiqui-
tous with the youth all over the world being engulfedby the existen-
tial vacuum. 
In light of man's precarious existential predicament, Salk (1975) 
poses the following questions: 
Is man programmed for relatively short term survival in 
which his end may come of his mvn doing? Or is he 
programmed for a life in which only those who have lost 
the power to discriminate, or who are otherwise degenerate, 
will continue to inhabit the planet as long as reproductive 
activity continues to supply "victims" of life? And what 
other alternatives exist? (p. 667) 
Salk quests for the end of the Darwinian epoch, replaced by an epoch 
requiring a complete inversion of values, an epoch ruled by the wisdom 
of cooperation in which the welfare of the individual and the welfare 
of the species are tightly bound. 
It has been widely assumed that cooperation and affective empathy 
are significantly related. Johnson (1975) tested this assumption and 
found that the predisposition for cooperative behavior is significantly 
related to affective empathy in elementary aged children and a pre-
disposition for competition "is related to a lack of affective 
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perspective taking ability or egocentism." (p. 870) 
The present investigation strongly infers the importance not 
only of affective empathy but also of socialization and autonomy for 
principled moral development. A world based on principled.morality 
would be a world based on justice, and justice is the foundation on 
which a world of love (agape) can be built. It is hoped that this 
study may contribute, however infinitesimally, to an epoch of coopera-
tion, an epoch of justice, an epoch of agape. 
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APPENDIX A 
NM<IE 
A) YES-NO 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10. 
B) YES-NO 
11. 
12. 
13. 
14. 
15. 
16. 
17. 
18. 
19. 
20. 
ANSWER SHEET FOR SEVENTH GRADE SAMPLE: CARROLL 
MORAL REASONING TEST 
BIRTHDATE AGE 
C) YES-NO 
21. 
22. 
23. 
24. 
25. 
26. 
27: 
28. 
29. 
30. 
D) YES-NO 
31. 
32. 
33. 
34. 
35. 
36. 
37. 
38. 
39. 
40. 
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GRADE 
NAME 
(EMPATHY) 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10. 
11. 
12. 
13. 
14. 
15. 
16. 
17. 
18. 
19. 
20. 
ANSWER SHEET FOR SEVENTH GRADE SAMPLE~ EMPATHY 
AUTONOMY~ AND SOCIALIZATION MEASURES 
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(AUTONOMY) (SOC I ALI ZATI ON) 
21. 1. 16. 
22. 2. 17. 
23. 3. 18. 
24. 4. 19. 
25. 5. 20. 
26. 6. 21. 
27. 7. 22. 
28. 8. 23. 
29. 9. 24. 
30. 10. 25. 
31. 11. 26. 
32. 12. 27. 
33. 13. 28. 
14. 29. 
15. 30. 
APPENDIX B 
* ** 
(+) 1. 
( +) 7. 
( +) 8. 
(+) 9. 
SIXTEEN ITEMS OF THE MODIFIED MEHRABIAN ., EPSTEIN 
AFFECTIVE EMPATHY SCALE 
It makes me sad to see a lonely stranger in a group. 
167 
I tend to get emotionally involved with a friend's problem. 
Sometimes the words of a love song can move me deeply. 
I tend to lose control of myself when I am bringing 
bad news to people. 
(+) 12. I would rather be a social worker than work in a job 
( +) 14. 
(-) 15. 
(+) 17. 
( +) 18. 
( +) 19. 
(-} 21. 
( +) 31. 
training center. 
I like to watch people open presents. 
Lonely people are probably unfriendly. 
Some songs make me happy. 
I really get involved with the feelings of the characters 
in a novel. 
I get v'ery angry when I see someone being mistreated. 
When a friend starts to talk about his problems, I try to 
steer the conversation to something else. 
I become very involved when I watch a movie. 
* The (+) and (-) signs indicate 
the direction of scoring. 
** The numeration of the items is 
that of the original scale. 
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